It is properly a separate agency, established for specific purposes by the same authority which for other purposes established the Executive and Legislative branches. It has no community of interest, direct or indirect, with these branches, and is in all respects the most competent and capable, as it is the proper constitutional judge of the extent of their powers, as defined by the great charter of the Union. But waving this point, upon which we are aware that the Vice-President's views would not agree with ours, and admitting for the moment and for argument's sake, that the Supreme Court is not the proper tribunal to decide in this case, the question still returns, Why resort to the form provided for making amendments? This is a form, in which the States act for a certain purpose within the pale of the Constitution. But this whole process of _nullification_,--if not, as we believe it to be, _unconstitutional_,--is at least, and is admitted to be by those who approve it, _extra-constitutional_. The State of Carolina throws herself back, (such is the received phrase) upon her _reserved rights_, and undertakes to decide, in her capacity as an independent State and a party to the Union, which she considers as a confederacy of independent States, whether the compact has been faithfully observed. She satisfies herself that it has been violated, and she now wishes to ascertain whether the other States agree with her in opinion. But how are these States to be consulted and to act in this matter? Obviously in the same capacity in which Carolina proposes it. She appears in this affair as a sovereign and independent power; as such she must address herself to the other States, and it is only in their capacity as sovereign and independent powers, resting on their reserved rights, that they can receive and act upon her communication. The whole affair, reasoning of course on the principles of the Vice-President, is _extra-constitutional_. Why then resort to a process, intended for the direction of the States while acting within the pale of the Constitution for its ordinary purposes? The Vice-President, in proposing this course, obviously forgets his own principles. The true one, on his system, would be very different. Having taken her stand upon her reserved rights and assumed the attitude of a sovereign power, Carolina should exhibit a little more of the lion port and awe-commanding face. Instead of resorting to a paltry humiliating process, which supposes throughout the subordination of all the parties concerned in it to the common authority of the Union, our _soi-disant_ sovereign, in order to be consistent, should send ambassadors to all the other States to communicate the business in hand. These again, being thus called on, must in like manner throw themselves back upon their reserved rights, and assume, for the time, the attitude of independent States. If a consultative meeting be deemed expedient, it must be a congress of ambassadors held by