In our Constitution, the idea of representing different interests in the machinery for making the law, has been retained in favor of the States. These, independently of their representation on the principle of the numerical amount of their population in the House of Representatives, have a distinct representation on a footing of perfect equality in the Senate. A bill, which has obtained the sanction of the two Houses of Congress, has _ipso facto_ been approved by a representation of the _absolute majority_ of the whole people of the Union, and of what the Vice-President is pleased to call the _concurring majority_, that is, a majority of the representatives of the States, considered as distinct communities. The arrangement is one, which the Vice-President, reasoning consistently upon his own theory, ought to consider as perfect. But this does not satisfy him. Not content with obtaining for each of and all the States a full representation, on the principle both of the absolute and concurring majorities,--the very thing which he professes to wish for,--he insists that each shall have _in addition_ for itself a right to _break_ the law, which it has itself concurred in making:--that each State, after co-operating by its presence in imposing upon the other States the obligations resulting from a law, has a right to exempt itself by its own separate act from bearing its own share of these burdens; and,--as the rights of all the States in this respect are of course the same,--that the law, which is in form binding upon every body, is in fact and in reality binding upon nobody, since each of the parties supposed to be bound by it possesses individually a right to break it.--A right to break the law! This is really too extravagant, and were it not for the respect which we have heretofore been disposed to entertain for the talents and character of Mr. Calhoun, we should find some difficulty in believing that he can be honest in expressing such opinions. The case furnishes a very strong example of the extent, to which party feeling and disappointed personal ambition can bewilder the conceptions of a naturally acute and powerful mind. If the Vice-President will review his principles, with only a small portion of the sagacity and correctness of judgment which he could bring to any other subject, he will see at once that the right which he claims for the States, is not that of being represented as distinct interests in the making of the law, (which they are by the Constitution) but that of _resisting_ the execution of it, when made; and that the proceedings in which he is engaged, whether justifiable or not, are essentially _revolutionary_.