But let us assume that we have succeeded in convincing those concerned of the genuineness of the disease at hand; what line of treatment should be recommended? In the first place, we must remember that the mental disorder, if it belongs to the group we are discussing here, is the result of a criminal act, and following in its wake, and that therefore the plea of insanity as an excuse for the deed must manifestly be excluded. But may not this type of reaction furnish us an index to the original personality of the culprit? In other words, should we consider an individual absolutely normal, if, in reaction to some stressful situation, he breaks down mentally and develops a psychosis? The majority of authorities maintain that these individuals are decidedly abnormal, and that it is only a poorly-knit organism which permits of that sort of reaction. Birnbaum,[3] for instance, insists that the possibility of a psychic incitation of a mental disorder is the criterion of a degenerative soil. This is undoubtedly too extreme a view, but the more one observes these cases, the more one is inclined to hesitate in calling these individuals normal in the accepted sense of the term. Let us assume for the moment that these psychotic reactions are indices of an abnormal personality. Is this defect of sufficient import to render the individual irresponsible in the eyes of the law? This question, I fear, cannot be answered very readily. Looking at it from a purely juridical standpoint, we must say no; because an individual is so loosely organized as to break down mentally under a given stress, does not at all imply that a knowledge of the difference between right and wrong is excluded. The jurist is willing to concede to the proposition of a poorly-organized nervous system, a degenerative make-up, a psychopathic constitution; but if these defects are such as to manifest themselves in crime, society must be given the inalienable right to protect itself from such defectives. The result is that either no extenuating circumstances are considered at all, and the individual is dealt with in the ordinary way, or he is adjudged insane and committed to a hospital for the criminal insane, whether or no insanity exists at the time of trial. Thus we have on the one hand a prison population which more properly belongs under the régime of a hospital, while on the other hand, we insist on keeping individuals locked up in hospitals for the insane, whether or no they show actual psychotic symptoms. If one of the latter class endeavors to obtain his release by habeas corpus, a tremendous howl is immediately raised by the public about the "insanity dodge", the worthlessness of expert testimony and the unpardonable offense of letting loose upon society a dangerous criminal. If we stop to consider for a moment, we must admit that in the great majority of instances, we are not dealing here with dangerous criminals. The man who as a result of a series of overwhelming