Hate then is at first much the same in its elements as anger. It is always objective. Hate is always of something, though extreme passion dulls perception, yet at its normal tension hate, like other emotions, is incentive to beneficial cognition. We are closely observant of those we hate. Beside sense of object, there is the will-stirring, the hostility, which is prominent in anger, though here more controlled and not so impetuous and naïve. Hate thus often allies itself with fear, but anger is very rarely coincident with it, though there may be rapid alternations. There is also a hate pain which is a parallel complex to the anger pain already analysed. We might term hate a distilled anger, and yet this signifies little, for the innermost emotion seems very distinct. Like fear and anger, hate seems a _genus_ by itself, and in its essential feature as emotion-reaction, quite beyond scientific analysis, which can point out its conditions, but not account for their total value or for the peculiar quality of hate disturbance by which hate is hate. Hate can be appreciated only by realization, but no matter how long we reflect upon and try to catch its exact nature in some definite formula, the essence of hate always eludes, and presents itself as only a bare simple psychosis wholly indefinable and inexplicable in its essential nature. But if we turn now to the origin and development of hate, shall we arrive at anything more satisfactory? Is hate a modified anger, or is it from the first a wholly distinct emotion and not slowly differentiated from any preceding psychosis? Hate evidently belongs with anger as aggressive emotional reaction, but it is very hard to see how it could originate by any slow growth, and it seems easier and simpler to regard it as being a unique response to some very pressing demand in the struggle of existence.