power in a poem by Rossetti, or the simple human grandeur in a painting by Millet. In some forms we know what it is to try to feel, to have dim and vague stirring of æsthetic emotion, and to reach new levels in emotion generally, and we know the stages of differentiation and the severe _nisus_ of the earlier realizations. On the _nisus_ side of our psychic life there is abundant opportunity for every one to observe the process of mental differentiation, and how slowly evolving a new emotion is, for instance, before it reaches a definite form, but there is the great range of purely natural, spontaneous life, deriving its whole _impetus_ from ancestral minds, where, as in hate and anger, it is impossible to study the slowly modifying forms precursory to the distinct mode. How can we find or produce in ourselves a state which is not yet hate, but merely hate in becoming, a half-differentiated, half-evolved hate? If we could put ourselves on the _nisus_ side, and look up to hate as something to be reached, instead of something we may fall into, we might attain some idea of its process of formation. But since hate, anger, and so forth, invariably come upon us and overcome us, how can we appreciate their evolutionary stages? If we could trace these old intermediate disused forms which merely lead up to others, we should find them very strange, and should need an entirely new nomenclature for them. But to reach back and realize long outgrown and fossil psychoses, will, if ever possible, require more exertion and ability than even the intense struggle of the actual psychical advances which adds, by the efforts of exceptional individuals—“geniuses”—new modes of cognition and feeling to the mind of a race. To regress beyond a certain point is harder than to progress. How then hate developed from non-hate, from anger, or from any other emotion, is obviously a very difficult problem. It would seem to us in our present stage of mentality that the first hate phenomenon was definitely and inexplicably such. We cannot perceive or conceive how the origin of hate is other than a sudden apparition of a new and elementary emotion in response to an extraordinary call upon some extraordinary organism in its life career. Yet we may easily believe that the direct occasion of its rise and progress was as complement to anger. Anger is certainly in general a very advantageous self-conservative factor, but by reason of its violence it requires a vast amount of vital energy to accomplish its end, and it thus also tends to disturb the cognitive power in its clear and cool actions. A burst of passion, though it may succeed in destroying the injurious, is both uneconomical and unintelligent. It is also a very transient phase. Anger will be defeated and supplanted in the evolution of life by some factor which has not these incidental disadvantages. Hate is such a superior psychosis, and is surer, steadier, and more economical than anger, and defeats it in the long run.