To anticipate what is to occur is plainly one of the most useful achievements of mind, for all providence implies apprehension and emotion therewith. But to look before and after is certainly not the prerogative of man alone, but anticipatory power is found throughout the realm of mind, and constitutes the larger portion of all cognition. To know a thing means, in general, to appreciate its potentiality; and all science is really prescience. Knowledge is not the immediate sensation, but the meaning of it for life; it is the ideal translation from one sense to another in feeling tendency. Thus, to scent is by itself a useless acquirement, but the connecting it with desired food is of the utmost service. The psychism gradually attains the power to interpret by various _media_ the nature, that is, the experienceability, of the environment. To foresee is then one of the commonest events in mind, and according to the painfulness or pleasurability foreseen is felt anger or fear, hope or desire, or allied emotions. But the foreseen does not always come to pass, and hence there results a new order of intellectual and emotional reaction. That what we had in mind would happen comes not, or is other than foreseen; this has a disturbing effect on cognition and emotion. Prescience defeated becomes not merely nescience, but there is the positive definite shock of surprise, and the emotion of disappointment or some correlated form. Surprise as the sense of contrast of real and ideal, involving personal sense of limitation and error, is, as we have noted (pp. 50 ff.), a painful experience. But where there is no preconceived notion, no expectation, there is no surprise, as Lumholtz remarks of the Australian savages, that they are not surprised at the railway and other wonders of civilization; they do not know enough to be surprised. The full apprehension and understanding of the gap between ideal and real is but very slowly attained. At first the thwarting is naturally and easily attributed to an enemy, and there is anger and pertinacious violence, but ultimately, by sad and repeated experience, mind is led to notice its own insufficiency, to feel that the conflict between the actual and the expected is due to subjective error rather than objective interference. Genuine surprise, as distinct from mere nervous shock, is then, I think, a later phenomenon than is generally supposed. What is often taken for surprise with animals and children is really eager attention. Again, certain modes of fright are often taken for surprise. But experience must have made a considerable advance in apprehension of experienceability before a real surprise can be manifested, which is always the correlative of a sudden contrariness of experience to what was preconceived. Surprise involves a certain measure of a theory of experience; in short, a more or less definite body of knowledge. One who has framed no ideas of what experience should be can