Still again, may attention designate intensity, or some certain degree of intensity? We may say of one, “he was looking inattentively,” or of a fixed, intense gaze, “he was looking very attentively.” A strong vision is thus opposed to weak as an attention. As all psychoses have some degree of intensity, they are thereby acts of attention, if we reckon from a zero point, or a more or less large number of consciousnesses if we reckon from some fixed degree of intensity. But to call a psychosis, because of its intensity, or because it has reached a certain degree thereof, an attention, seems an unnecessary procedure. Nothing is gained by describing an intense psychosis as an attention, and certainly intense pains and pleasures hardly come under the term. Nor yet are intense cognitions, merely by reason of the intensity, properly states of attention. Fixed ideas are commonly intense, yet there is no true attention, as we have before intimated. Cognitions which come as intense must be marked off from those which are intense by reason of a self-determined self-consciousness intensifying. The essence of attention is intensifying act self-regulated. To be sure, intense presentations are given as such only by an heredity _momentum_, from past ancestral intensifyings; their _impetus_ is on the basis of past cognitive exertions. Presentation intensity, and, indeed, all mental intensity, is originally and fundamentally volitional; the act had its force solely in will power; but in late phases psychoses which originally required intense exertion rise spontaneously and have a strength and persistence apart from volition, and so the word attention does not rightly apply to them. Thus also we can solve the problem that Mr. Ward states when he says, “How the intensity that presentations have apart from volition is related to that which they have by means of it—how the objective component is related to the subjective—is a hard problem; still there is no gain in a spurious simplicity that ignores the difference” (_Mind_, xii. p. 65). But “objective component” and “subjective” do not enter into the question; cognition does not arise as a given, as forced and determined from without, but it is rather at bottom a mode of volition. Still attention is not then cognition intensity in general.