There are, of course, many degrees of interest. Often interest is so slight as not to rouse attention, being too weak to overcome natural inertia to will effort or unable to deflect will as bent by some conflicting interest. A lesson is to be learned, but the interest, often extrinsic, does not rise to attention point till possibly a few minutes before recitation. The interest, fear of failure, may then be sufficiently strong to induce very vigorous attention, and within a certain range the stronger the interest, the stronger the attention. Yet at a certain point of intensity emotion begins to derange will activity and to hinder and even destroy attention. Fear which has become fright extinguishes attention. Self-controlling power of attention is lost in a flood of emotion. Yet ungovernably intense emotion is no longer properly termed interest, which always implies cognitive power. Interest is properly comparatively mild emotion state, which includes definite cognitive element. But interest may be not only at or below attention point, but it may be of such an intensity and kind as to do away with need of attention, securing a spontaneous, or practically spontaneous, cognition. Thus, my interest in a book may at first be insufficient, _i.e._, practically _nil_, to constrain attention in any degree; it may become so strong that I make constant cognitive effort, and finally, as it becomes profound and absorbing, I cognize without any attention. When anything becomes sufficiently interesting, interest acts of itself directly upon cognition, which is then performed without attention. Interest frequently increases to the spontaneous cognition point, carries cognition in it; but we must remember, nevertheless, that all cognition had its origin in attention. Interest acquired and become habitual demands less and less force of attention, so that our customary interests finally awake cognition without any attention act. If given cognitions always required the original will effort,—attention,—intellect could not progress, delicate and far-reaching reactions could not be initiated, for they could have no basis. The force of inherent hereditary interests makes itself felt throughout all advanced psychic life. A survey of the cognitions of any single day would show us that by far the greater number are by this type and degree of interest. The common cognitions and adjustments of every-day life in walking, sitting down, and in matters of routine, are mostly of this type.