When an object is to be competed for, but we consider it beneath us to enter the lists, or we think our rivals unworthy of our attention, we have the peculiar phase of feeling termed arrogance. Arrogance brooks no rivalry and stands apart on a peak of self-contained superiority. Walter Savage Landor, the proudest of men, displays this feeling in perfection when he says in one of his cameos in verse: “I strove with none, For none were worth my strife.” This is a perfect expression of complete arrogance. We may say that he was too proud to be proud. No one was worthy of his mettle, and so he held himself aloof with the feeling of immeasurable superiority. Strictly speaking then, arrogance is a variety of very intense pride where the sense of superiority is perfectly exclusive and absolute, and disdains comparison. It is entirely inconsiderate of others’ rivalry and above caring for the approval or disapproval or admiration of others. Thus this phase, unlike pride in general, seeks concealment rather than display; its excellence is so far beyond the common as to be unappreciable by contemporaries, and appreciated by self alone. Conceit is a term objectively applied, but hardly indicates a kind of pride, a real subjective distinction. He who thinks more highly of himself than he ought to think, esteems himself beyond his due, and so is considered by the community over proud, is termed conceited. The pride which is entirely just, as viewed from the objective standpoint, is quite the same subjectively as the most preposterous conceit. Similarly also dignity is no real feeling. “That man is dignified”; this is an objective characterization of his manner of conduct, but this does not imply that he feels dignified. Pride may give a dignified demeanour, but a feeling dignified can only refer to the reactive effect upon consciousness, of this mode of behaviour. “I feel proud,” may likewise sometimes be used, not for designating the subjective feeling or being proud, but as equal to, “I felt that I was proud,” that is, “I was proud and I knew it,” “I had the sense of being proud.” So also in general we may remark that while feeling may denote a simple state of being, yet such phrases as “I felt proud,” “felt angry,” etc., are ambiguous, and may mean either the bare feeling of pride, anger, etc., as experienced, or the feeling of being proud, angry, etc., or both, that is, consciousness of the particular consciousness may or may not complicate self-consciousness. The word, feel, is often used in this merely reflexive way to denote a sense of state as, “I was proud and I felt so at the time.” Thus common phrase verifies the analysis that self-consciousness and consciousness of consciousness are bound up with emotion, the full analysis of the phrase showing that the feeling proud was an object consciousness _plus_ a subject consciousness.