To the spheres of simple and relational sense beauty we have to add a third—representative beauty. A colour, or two or more in combination which give æsthetic satisfaction, will also please in hallucinatory vision and in representation proper where the revival is recognised in its unreality and representative nature, and also in recollection where the memory is willed. The mere imaging these colours without any definite time relation also gives æsthetic pleasure. It is, indeed, a pleonasm to say that æsthetic revivals are æsthetic. However, imagination is productive as well as reproductive, hence the ideal achieves a fuller beauty than the real. Where the mind, prompted by æsthetic desire, determines its own object, this object can more fully satisfy it than reality, which is always imperfect. Thus art surpasses nature, or more strictly is a higher nature. Idealism then is a mode of realism, and realism is but the ideal of actuality. But the imaging activity may, like the perceptive, be considered as in itself a source of æsthetic pleasure. Imaging is primarily used in the service of life, as when walking in a forest I hear a peculiar cry, imagine a wolf, and flee. When imaging has been largely developed thus, it may often act as a mere vent to energy; but this kind of activity has here, no more than elsewhere, real æsthetic quality. At the animistic stage children imagine in this way long before they æsthetically image. When we consciously and with some self-direction enjoy imaging for its own sake, we attain the æsthetic sphere. The æsthetic pleasures which are suggested by such a phrase as— “Fair ship, that from the Italian shore Sails the placid ocean plains”— are not merely the sum of the original sense pleasures, but perceptive and imaginative pleasure _per se_ is added, the image is more beautiful than the real vision, and this perception than some sense element, as the light sensation implied in “placid.” Æsthetic pleasure, even in sense, and much more in perceiving and imagining, is a _delight_, that is, æsthetic quality is an emotion quality, it is not a mere feeling from an object, but a feeling about it. Now emotion may be enacted for emotion’s sake and so an æsthetic pleasure wave be generated. This is the pleasure we take in the pathetic—pity, the sublime, fear as awe, the tragic-horror. These emotions are realized for themselves as a mode of pleasurable activity. Æsthetic emotion is also very largely emotion at emotion, as a feeling for the expressive, still here the emotion is for its own sake.