Studies in the Evolutionary Psychology of FeelingStanley, Hiram Miner
Philosophy
Studies in the Evolutionary Psychology of Feeling
Stanley, Hiram Miner
Emotions
All reflex theories take us above the realm of simple consciousness
acting directly for life, and this is the very form which seems
commonest, and which appears to be full of passing pleasures and pains.
That consciousness does react on itself in late phases is plain, but if
consciousness, like other functions, has developed from the extremely
simple to the extremely complex, this self-reaction cannot be regarded
as primitive. Not till consciousness becomes integrated as a manifold
organism do pleasure and pain become prominent as reflexes. We are not
now looking for the functional value of pleasure and pain in mind itself
as an independent whole; but regarding its functional quality and that
of all mentality in life values, and here the functional meaning of such
reflexes is secondary. In mind, as organic continuous whole,
pleasure-pain is both resultant and excitant; it stands related to an
antecedent state and it is stimulant to following states. Its function
is excitant and it is the starting point of all other mentality, both
originally and in the later manifestation. The having pleasure-pain is
what starts both motor and cognitive volition.
It has, indeed, been maintained that while pleasure-pain is not a
product or concomitant of some psychosis, as sensation, it is itself a
sensation, a definite mode of sensibility. I have a pain sense just as I
have a temperature sense, I feel pain in the same way as I feel warm,
and by the analogous sensory nerves. With reference to this theory we
must ask, since sensation is correspondent to modes of objects, to what
mode is pain correspondent? Sense responds to modes of object, as light,
and sonorous vibrations; but pain is not based on any such mode of
objects. If pain were, there would have been long since a department of
physics, which would have treated that basis just as it treats light,
heat, sound, etc. But we all know that an object is not painful or
pleasing in the same way that it is warm or cold, heavy or light. I do
not say the stone feels heavy and painful, but I do say the stone feels
painfully heavy, that is feeling pain is not a state of awareness.
Further, having pain or pleasure is not by any sensing effort. I do not
try to feel pain as I try to see the light of a star or feel the warm
spot in a bar of iron. To be sure, the doctor asks his patient, “do you
feel any pain?” and after a moment’s delay the answer may be, “yes,” but
this is not in the nature of a sensing effort, but merely an
attentiveness to bodily conditions as affecting mental state, not an
objective attention but an analytical self-attention. Still further, a
neural basis for pleasure-pain is altogether likely, but even if these
nerves were found to be generally distributed over the body, this would
not prove sensation, but merely that pleasure-pain is functional
throughout the organism, diffusive organic consciousness. If
pleasure-pain is primitive, and neurality and mentality correlate, the
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