It is evident that as far as excitement is regarded merely as intensity, as a fundamental element in all feeling and mental action, it is a confusion of terms to apply quality to it, to speak of it as either pleasurable, or painful, or neutral. Intensity of mental action has degrees but not quality, just as pitch in sound has degree, but not timbre or quality. Regarding excitement as feeling-of-intensity, it has the general characteristics of all feelings, and is not more likely to be neutral than any other feeling. Taking the case of surprise, which is so frequently instanced as a neutral feeling, let us analyse it with special reference to the excitement as feeling of intensity of cognition. A typical case would be the surprise from hearing thunder in January. The presentation is quickly compared with a representation of observed order of facts, and the disagreement of the two marked. This is so far purely cognitive activity; but immediately connected with the perception of disagreement is the forcible recognition of the breaking up of a more or less rigid order. There is a disturbance in cognitive activity and the tension breaks into consciousness as excitement, the feeling of intensity. The conflict of a settled conviction with recent presentation intensifies consciousness, and this intensity with the abrupt change in quantity and quality of mental activity breaks into consciousness as intellectual sense of shock accompanied and closely followed by feeling of unpleasantness and pain. It is to be noted that when we come upon the feeling-element in surprise we find pain. Surprise in the strict sense is then the reflex act of consciousness in which the mind becomes aware of and feels the sudden disturbance and tension set up in itself by the sudden weakening of an established belief. The painful shock has some relation to the force of the disturbing factor, but is more closely connected with the strength of the belief assailed. The feeling of the disagreement as pain is due to the fact that this disagreement impinges on subjectivity, personal opinion and conviction, and the disturbance will be more or less disagreeable according to the degree of personal interest. Note that by exact statement the feeling is not painful, but is the pain concomitant or resultant upon the mental perception. The surprise for a person of rather weak habit of mind and of little generalising power will be almost wholly intellectual. Disagreement will be noted, but not felt. For one of strong intellectual interest, the surprise will mean definite and acute pain. For a meteorologist who has written a book stating that in this latitude thunder does not occur in January the surprise might be very grievous. The intellectual element in surprise is emphasized in the statement “I am surprised,” the feeling-element in “I feel surprised.” If antecedent states of representation, comparison and inner perception are placed under the