It will be remarked that admitting, as we do, the constant existence in mental life of feeling as pleasure and pain, we thereby make this a real _continuum_. But we may say that consciousness is never without a pleasure-pain constituent and yet not assert a _continuum_. Consciousness continually possesses some pleasure-pain element, but this is not a feeling as continuous state, as an underlying differentiating basis pleasures and pains as diverse independent states are essential incentives in all consciousness, but they do not constitute a single continuum. Of course, every consciousness, as long as it continues, is in this very general sense a _continuum_, but no form of consciousness, primitive or advanced, can, with one exception, be called a _continuum_, as a single mode running through and unifying a long stretch of varied consciousnesses. This exception is the complex element of ego-tone. Early mind is no more than a kaleidoscopic jumble, with no one organizing and unifying element. Even when consciousness from happening in purely disconnected flashes attains first a certain limited continuity, this is not by means of some conscious element persisting through a series, but merely signifies that as fast as one consciousness dies out, another takes its place, _i.e._, the continuity is purely formal and temporal. It is through self-consciousness alone that any real _continuum_ is achieved in and for consciousness, and this ego-tone is far from being primitive. The sensation and objectifying as discussed in this chapter in connection with feeling, both pain and pleasure, constitutes complex states of consciousness which may be termed a feeling when the pain or pleasure is dominant, or a cognition when the sensing and objectifying is dominant. Thus by a feeling I understand a state of consciousness which is either entirely or dominantly pain or pleasure, the former being pure feeling, the latter mixed feeling. This latter class constitutes the feelings properly so-called, as varied pains and pleasures, the variation element being the cognition in some form. Feeling as being in different kinds is made such by the differentiation of cognition. Thus hunger is neither a pure sensation—that is by pure sensation meaning not absolutely pure, for pleasure or pain is invariable incentive concomitant, but sensation pure from any distinct mode of apprehension, as merely general and undifferentiated—nor yet is hunger pure pain, but it is the combination of a certain definite sensing, beyond the pure stage, with pain. Hunger is a feeling when the pain aspect is dominant, is cognition when sensation aspect is dominant. The confusion in the use of the terms sensation and feeling comes from the difficulty in determining dominancy in given cases. Certainly the exact line where feeling of hunger passes into sensation of hunger can be settled only by the most careful discrimination, but at any great