An organism, which has suffered knowingly from an object, and so feared, attains at length the power of fearing antecedent to any real injury. This seems to be brought about somewhat in the following manner: If I in any way, as by a pin pricking, rouse a sleeping animal to a cognition of an object which has often injured it, and which it has often feared, immediately there would re-occur the original concomitants of the cognition in the previous cases; there would be pain, cognition of pain, ascription to object, and fear, all merely revivals, and happening most probably before any actual injury, etc., received in the present case. Now these revivals, as before insisted, do not and cannot in themselves alone form a new fear. This is only constituted when the revival pains are known as such, when they are not merely presented in consciousness, but represented as belonging to past experience of thing, and so to be experienced. The thing is thereby truly _interpreted_ for its feeling value. Not merely pain, as being experienced, is connected with thing, but as having been experienced, and to be experienced. Thus only arises that sense of the experienceable, that real _apprehension_ for the future, which is so valuable an acquisition in the struggle for existence. Feeling quality comes thus to be assigned as real and permanent property of things, and every cognition comes to imply representation of feeling value, and so to be a basis for emotion. But all sense of experienceability is founded on sense of experience; the sense of things as possibilities of sensation and feeling is based on actual relatings of feelings to objects in simple direct experiences. Fear is in itself pre-eminently a painful state, and we have to inquire as to the origin and nature of this pain. The statement of the problem in general form is, how does that which does not yet please or pain, but is only cognized as about to do so, give immediate pleasure or pain?