The fourth and shortest essay on the “Transformation of the Axolotl into Amblystoma,” starts primarily with the intention of showing that cases of sudden transformation are no proof of _per saltum_ development. When this essay first appeared the view was still widely entertained that we had here a case proving _per saltum_ development. That this explanation was erroneous is now generally admitted, but I believe that those who suppose that we have here to deal with some quite ordinary phenomenon which requires no explanation, now go too far towards the other extreme. The term “larval reproduction” is an _expression_, but no _explanation_; we have therefore to attempt to find out the true interpretation, but whether the one which I have given is correct must be judged of by others. These four essays lead up to a fifth and concluding one “On the Mechanical Conception of Nature.” Whilst the results obtained are here summed up, it is attempted to form them into a philosophical conception of Nature and of the Universe. It will be thought by many that this should have been left to professed philosophers, and I readily admit that I made this attempt with some misgiving. Two considerations, however, induced me to express here my own views. The first was that the facts of science are frequently misunderstood, or at any rate not estimated at their true value, by philosophers;[2] the second consideration was, that even certain naturalists and certainly very many non-naturalists, turn distrustfully from the results of science, because they fear that these would infallibly lead to a view of the Universe which is to them unacceptable, viz. the materialistic view. With regard to the former I wished to show that the views of the development of organic Nature inaugurated by Darwin and defended in this work are certainly correctly designated _mechanical_; with reference to the latter I wished to prove that such a mechanical conception of the organic world and of Nature in general, by no means leads merely to one single philosophical conception of Nature, viz. to Materialism, but that on the contrary it rather admits of legitimate development in a quite different manner.