In such cases the mind is often not conscious of any mental action; and others, who observe these facts, are led, sometimes, to confound what, in such cases, is a deductive judgment, with intuitiveness. The judgment, thus formed without any perceptible succession of thought, is merely the result of acquirement from long experience and habits of active ratiocination. Some few instances of this unconscious and rapid thought have been exemplified by mathematicians, when the calculator could give no account how he arrived at the conclusion. Will any one claim that they abstract their answers from the most abstruse propositions intuitively, or by instinct, or by any new and distinct faculty of the mind? This habit of mind is as applicable to morals as to any thing else. But in mathematics the data are everywhere the same; whereas in morals the data are as different among men as are their conditions of life; because our ideas of right and wrong, existing in the mind before the judgment is formed on the case to be considered, were introduced by the aid of the senses, through the medium of experience and education; and it is, therefore, quite obvious that the idea of right in one man may be quite like the idea of wrong in another. But it remains to show the fallacy of the argument by which Dr. Wayland arrives at his conclusion. Let us examine the paragraph quoted, and sift from verbiage the naked points of the argument: “We do actually observe a moral quality in the actions of men.” “Do we perceive this quality of actions by a single faculty, or a combination of faculties? This notion” (the perception of the moral quality of an action) “is, in its nature, simple and ultimate, and distinct from every other notion.” “We have a distinct faculty to make us acquainted with the existence of all other distinct qualities.” “Therefore, it is self-evident that this is a separate and distinct faculty.” The syllogism is defective because the idea of right or wrong is not simple nor ultimate, but complex, and ever subject to change from the influence of any new light presented to the mind. Nor is it true that we possess a distinct faculty to make us acquainted with each distinct quality; for, if so, the mind would be merely a very large bundle of faculties; and we should neither possess nor stand in need of any reasoning powers whatever, because the naked truth about every thing would always stand revealed before us by these faculties; which, we think, is not the fact. In syllogistic argument, the first principles must be something that cannot be otherwise—unalterable—an eternal truth; “because these qualities cannot belong to the conclusion unless they belong to the premises, which are its causes.” The syllogism will then stand thus: It is not true our notion, or idea, of the moral quality of an action “is simple and ultimate, and distinct from any other idea or notion:”