Submarine and Anti-submarineNewbolt, Henry John, Sir
History
Submarine and Anti-submarine
Newbolt, Henry John, Sir
Submarines (Ships); World War, 1914-1918 -- Naval operations -- Submarine
These ports had, during the past two years, become more and more
important to the U-boat campaign, and had therefore been more and more
strongly guarded and fortified against attack. The section of coast
upon which they lie had a system of defensive batteries, which included
no less than 120 heavy guns, some of them of 15-inch calibre. A battery
of these was upon the Mole at Zeebrugge--a solid stone breakwater
more than a mile long, which contained also a railway terminus, a
seaplane station, huge sheds for personnel and material, and, at the
extreme seaward end, a lighthouse with searchlight and range-finder.
An attacking force must reckon with a large number of defenders upon
the Mole alone, besides the batteries and reinforcements on shore,
and the destroyers and other ships in the harbour. But the attack on
the Mole was an indispensable part of the enterprise; for the enemy’s
attention must be diverted from the block-ships, which were to arrive
during the fight and sink themselves in the mouth of the canal. And in
order to deal satisfactorily with the Mole, it must be cut off from the
reinforcements on shore by the destruction of the railway viaduct which
formed the landward end of it.
That was not all. The main difficulty of the plan was the management
of the approach and return of the expedition. The conditions were
extremely severe. First, the attacking force must effect a complete
surprise and reach the Mole before the guns of the defence could
be brought to bear upon them. The enemy searchlights must therefore
be put out of action, as far as possible, by an artificial fog or
smoke-screen; but again, this must not be dense enough to obscure
the approach entirely. Secondly, the work must be done in very short
time, and to the minute; for though the attack might be a surprise,
the return voyage must be made under fire. The shore batteries were
known to have a destructive range of sixteen miles; to clear out of
the danger zone would take the flotilla two hours, and daylight would
begin by 3.30 A.M. It was, therefore, necessary to leave the Mole by
1.30; and as, for similar reasons, it was impossible to arrive before
midnight, an hour and a half was all that the time-table could allow
for fighting, blocking, and getting away again. To do things as exactly
as this, a night must be chosen when wind, weather and tide would all
be favourable. We need not be surprised at hearing that the expedition
had twice before started and been compelled to return without reaching
its objective--once it was actually within fifteen miles of the
Mole--but fortunately the Germans, having no efficient patrol at
sea, got no hint of what was being planned; and in the end were so
completely taken by surprise, that some of their guns when captured had
not even had the covers removed from them!
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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