which the Austrian army underwent in 1866 when they were compelled to learn the merits of the breechloader by studying it on the field of battle. There was room for improvement in the attitude we had taken up in regard to submarine navigation.” During the short session of December, 1900, after the General Election, the Admiralty was again questioned, and the reply was that the “attention of the Admiralty had been called to the additional provision for submarine boats in the French naval programme, and a statement will be made when the estimates are laid before the House.” Between this date and the introduction of the Navy Estimates endless rumours regarding the position the Admiralty would take as to the submarine boat question found their way into the daily press. While, on the one hand, it was “confidently asserted” that, the Government were making secret trials with all kinds of wonderful craft, on the other hand it was stated “on the highest authority” that the Lords of the Admiralty had no intention of altering their minds as to the advisability of taking any action whatever in the matter. The statement of the First Lord of the Admiralty explanatory of the Navy Estimates for 1901–2, published on the 1st of March, 1901, contained the following item:— “Five submarine vessels of the type invented by Mr. Holland have been ordered, the first of which should be delivered next autumn. What the future value of these boats may be in naval warfare can only be a matter of conjecture. The experiments with these boats will assist the Admiralty in assessing their true value. The question of their employment must be studied, and all developments in their mechanism carefully watched by this country.” In the discussion on the Navy (Supplementary) Estimates on March 4, 1901, Mr. Flynn asked whether the policy of the Admiralty in constructing battleships “as to the strength of which they knew nothing,” when other nations were turning their attention to submarine vessels, was quite wise. This same notion as to the advisability of going in for small submarines instead of big battleships is to be found in a speech by Mr. O’Shee on March 23rd, who said that if these boats were able to do half what was claimed for them, then the present gigantic expenditure for naval construction was entirely uncalled for. A submarine boat could be built for £25,000, and manned by ten men, and if it were true they were able to combat the big ships which the Government were building, those ships would be absolutely useless except for carrying the submarine boats to places where they were to work. If submarines were all that was claimed for them it would render unnecessary the £9,000,000 which was then being expended on new battleships. Mr. Arnold Forster in the House on March 18, 1901, said:—