But this idea of value was wholly intuitive with Adam Smith, and society does not change its habits upon the strength of intuitions; it decides only upon the authority of facts. The antinomy had to be expressed in a plainer and clearer manner: J. B. Say was its principal interpreter. But, in spite of the imaginative efforts and fearful subtlety of this economist, Smith's definition controls him without his knowledge, and is manifest throughout his arguments. "To put a value on an article," says Say, "is to DECLARE that it should be ESTIMATED equally with some other designated article. . . . . . The value of everything is vague and arbitrary UNTIL IT IS RECOGNIZED. . . . . ." There is, therefore, a method of recognizing the value of things,--that is, of determining it; and, as this recognition or determination results from the comparison of things with each other, there is, further, a common feature, a principle, by means of which we are able to DECLARE that one thing is worth more or less than, or as much as, another. Say first said: "The measure of value is the value of another product." Afterwards, having seen that this phrase was but a tautology, he modified it thus: "The measure of value is the QUANTITY of another product," which is quite as unintelligible. Moreover, this writer, generally so clear and decided, embarrasses himself with vain distinctions: "We may APPRECIATE the value of things; we cannot MEASURE it,--that is, COMPARE it with an invariable and known standard, for no such standard exists. We can do nothing but ESTIMATE THE VALUE of things by comparing them." At other times he distinguishes between REAL values and RELATIVE values: "The former are those whose value changes with the cost of production; the latter are those whose value changes relatively to the value of other kinds of merchandise."