Systematic Theology (Volume 1 of 3)Strong, Augustus Hopkins
Religion
Systematic Theology (Volume 1 of 3)
Strong, Augustus Hopkins
Baptists -- Doctrines; Theology, Doctrinal
In a case where only circumstantial evidence is attainable, many
lines of proof sometimes converge, and though no one of the lines
reaches the mark, the conclusion to which they all point becomes
the only rational one. To doubt that there is a London, or that
there was a Napoleon, would indicate insanity; yet London and
Napoleon are proved by only probable evidence. There is no
constraining efficacy in the arguments for God’s existence; but
the same can be said of all reasoning that is not demonstrative.
Another interpretation of the facts is _possible_, but no other
conclusion is so _satisfactory_, as that God is; see Fisher,
Nature and Method of Revelation, 129. Prof. Rogers: “If in
practical affairs we were to hesitate to act until we had absolute
and demonstrative certainty, we should never begin to move at
all.” For this reason an old Indian official advised a young
Indian judge “always to give his verdict, but always to avoid
giving the grounds of it.”
Bowne, Philos. of Theism, 11-14—“Instead of doubting everything
that can be doubted, let us rather doubt nothing until we are
compelled to doubt.... In society we get on better by assuming
that men are truthful, and by doubting only for special reasons,
than we should if we assumed that all men are liars, and believed
them only when compelled. So in all our investigations we make
more progress if we assume the truthfulness of the universe and of
our own nature than we should if we doubted both.... The first
method seems the more rigorous, but it can be applied only to
mathematics, which is a purely subjective science. When we come to
deal with reality, the method brings thought to a standstill....
The law the logician lays down is this: Nothing may be believed
which is not proved. The law the mind actually follows is this:
Whatever the mind demands for the satisfaction of its subjective
interests and tendencies may be assumed as real, in default of
positive disproof.”
Remark 2. A consideration of these arguments may also serve to explicate
the contents of an intuition which has remained obscure and only half
conscious for lack of reflection. The arguments, indeed, are the efforts
of the mind that already has a conviction of God’s existence to give to
itself a formal account of its belief. An exact estimate of their logical
value and of their relation to the intuition which they seek to express in
syllogistic form, is essential to any proper refutation of the prevalent
atheistic and pantheistic reasoning.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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