Phenomena may be internal, _e. g._, thoughts; in this case the noumenon is the mind, of which these thoughts are the manifestations. Or, phenomena may be external, _e. g._, color, hardness, shape, size; in this case the noumenon is matter, of which these qualities are the manifestations. But qualities, whether mental or material, imply the existence of a substance to which they belong: they can no more be conceived of as existing apart from substance, than the upper side of a plank can be conceived of as existing without an under side; see Bowne, Review of Herbert Spencer, 47, 207-217; Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory, 1; 455, 456—“Comte’s assumption that mind cannot know itself or its states is exactly balanced by Kant’s assumption that mind cannot know anything outside of itself.... It is precisely because all knowledge is of relations that it is not and cannot be of phenomena alone. The absolute cannot _per se_ be known, because in being known it would _ipso facto_ enter into relations and be absolute no more. But neither can the phenomenal _per se_ be known, _i. e._, be known as phenomenal, without simultaneous cognition of what is non-phenomenal.” McCosh, Intuitions, 138-154, states the characteristics of substance as (1) being, (2) power, (3) permanence. Diman, Theistic Argument, 337, 363—“The theory that disproves God, disproves an external world and the existence of the soul.” We know something beyond phenomena, viz.: law, cause, force,—or we can have no science; see Tulloch, on Comte, in Modern Theories, 53-73; see also Bib. Sac., 1874:211; Alden, Philosophy, 44; Hopkins, Outline Study of Man, 87; Fleming, Vocab. of Philosophy, art.: Phenomena; New Englander, July, 1875:537-539. B. Because we can know only that which bears analogy to our own nature or experience. We reply: (_a_) It is not essential to knowledge that there be similarity of nature between the knower and the known. We know by difference as well as by likeness. (_b_) Our past experience, though greatly facilitating new acquisitions, is not the measure of our possible knowledge. Else the first act of knowledge would be inexplicable, and all revelation of higher characters to lower would be precluded, as well as all progress to knowledge which surpasses our present attainments. (_c_) Even if knowledge depended upon similarity of nature and experience, we might still know God, since we are made in God’s image, and there are important analogies between the divine nature and our own.