We conclude that the immaterial part of man, viewed as an individual and conscious life, capable of possessing and animating a physical organism, is called ψυχή; viewed as a rational and moral agent, susceptible of divine influence and indwelling, this same immaterial part is called πνεῦμα. The πνεῦμα, then, is man’s nature looking Godward, and capable of receiving and manifesting the Πνεῦμα ἅγιον; the ψυχή is man’s nature looking earthward, and touching the world of sense. The πνεῦμα is man’s higher part, as related to spiritual realities or as capable of such relation; the ψυχή is man’s higher part, as related to the body, or as capable of such relation. Man’s being is therefore not trichotomous but dichotomous, and his immaterial part, while possessing duality of powers, has unity of substance. Man’s nature is not a three-storied house, but a two-storied house, with windows in the upper story looking in two directions—toward earth and toward heaven. The lower story is the physical part of us—the body. But man’s “upper story” has two aspects; there is an outlook toward things below, and a skylight through which to see the stars. “Soul” says Hovey, “is spirit as modified by union with the body.” Is man then the same in kind with the brute, but different in degree? No, man is different in kind, though possessed of certain powers which the brute has. The frog is not a magnified sensitive-plant, though his nerves automatically respond to irritation. The animal is different in kind from the vegetable, though he has some of the same powers which the vegetable has. God’s powers include man’s; but man is not of the same substance with God, nor could man be enlarged or developed into God. So man’s powers include those of the brute, but the brute is not of the same substance with man, nor could he be enlarged or developed into man. Porter, Human Intellect, 39—“The spirit of man, in addition to its higher endowments, may also possess the lower powers which vitalize dead matter into a human body.” It does not follow that the soul of the animal or plant is capable of man’s higher functions or developments, or that the subjection of man’s spirit to body, in the present life, disproves his immortality. Porter continues: “That the soul begins to exist as a vital force, does not require that it should always exist as such a force or in connection with a material body. Should it require another such body, it may have the power to create it for itself, as it has formed the one it first inhabited; or it may have already formed it, and may hold it ready for occupation and use as soon as it sloughs off the one which connects it with the earth.”