Julius Müller, Doctrine of Sin, 2:54—“A being is free, in so far as the inner centre of its life, from which it acts, is conditioned by self-determination. It is not enough that the deciding agent in an act be the man himself, his own nature, his distinctive character. In order to have accountability, we must have more than this; we must prove that this, his distinctive nature and character, springs from his own volition, and that it is itself the product of freedom in moral development. _Matt. 12:33_—‘_make the tree good, and its fruit good_’—combines both. Acts depend upon nature; but nature again depends upon the primary decisions of the will (‘_make the tree good_’). Some determinism is not denied; but it is partly limited [by the will’s remaining power of choice] and partly traced back to a former self-determining.” _Ibid._, 67—“If freedom be the self-determining of the will from that which is undetermined, Determinism is found wanting,—because in its most spiritual form, though it grants a self-determination of the will, it is only such a one as springs from a determinateness already present; and Indifferentism is found wanting too, because while it maintains indeterminateness as presupposed in every act of will, it does not recognize an actual self-determining on the part of the will, which, though it be a self-determining, yet begets determinateness of character.... We must, therefore, hold the doctrine of a _conditional_ and _limited_ freedom.” E. Will and contrary choice.—(_a_) Though no act of pure will is possible, the soul may put forth single volitions in a direction opposed to its previous ruling purpose, and thus far man has the power of a contrary choice (Rom. 7:18—“to will is present with me”). (_b_) But in so far as will has entered into and revealed itself in permanent states of intellect and sensibility and in a settled bent of the will itself, man cannot by a single act reverse his moral state, and in this respect has not the power of a contrary choice. (_c_) In this latter case he can change his character only indirectly, by turning his attention to considerations fitted to awaken opposite dispositions, and by thus summoning up motives to an opposite course.