“At 10 P. M., 48 battalions of the VIIth, VIIIth and IInd Corps occupied a space of barely 1500 m. front and a depth of 1000 m., east of the Mance ravine opposite the French position. Fortunately the enemy was so exhausted that we were able to commit the most serious mistakes with impunity under the very muzzles of his rifles.”[197] [197] _Ibid._, p. 224. “At =Sedan= bodies of infantry of the XIth Corps, as well as of the 46th Infantry and of the 5th Jäger-Battalion, had gotten mixed up with the 43rd Brigade during the course of the battle. The regiments of the 43rd Brigade had likewise been so disorganized that after the capture of =Cazal= the brigade commander had nothing at his disposal but the most heterogeneous mass of troops consisting of about a battalion.”[198] [198] _Gen. St. W._, II, p. 1249. “In penetrating into =Lovtcha= (1877) the foremost battalions became disorganized. The companies, and even single soldiers, stood around in irregular groups on the streets, crowded into the houses and sought cover in drainage ditches.”[199] “In one battalion of the _Kasan_ Regiment, which was to move through the town from the left flank, officers and men threw themselves down when the enemy’s fire became effective and only with difficulty could they be induced to rise. When the regimental commander fell, everybody fled, carrying along those in rear. Only two company columns, composed of stragglers of different organizations, resisted, deployed into a dense skirmish line and, encouraged by their officers, rushed forward cheering.”[200] [199] KUROPATKIN-KRAHMER, _Kritische Rückblicke auf den Russich-Türkischen Krieg_, I, pp. 68 and 72. [200] _Ibid._, I, p. 72. This fighting power of improvised units, when there were officers left to lead them, was displayed on several occasions at =Plevna=. The IInd and IIIrd Battalions of the _Kaluga_ Regiment (in the third battle of =Plevna=) after taking the second crest, thoughtlessly continued the advance in complete disorder. “Skobeleff foresaw the coming reverse and attempted to form a reserve, but only by dint of the greatest exertions on the part of the officers was it possible to collect about 100 men belonging to various companies. The men of the IInd and IIIrd Battalions of the Kaluga Regiment were scattered all over the battlefield, the companies had become completely mixed up, and it was a matter of the greatest difficulty to re-form them.”[201] [201] _Ibid._, I, p. 154.