While the frontage is thus increased, an equal density along the entire attacking line is not produced. This is due to the fact that one will endeavor to increase the distribution in depth only at the point where the decision is sought (offensive wings), while one will seek to obtain results by a generous expenditure of ammunition at points where the enemy is only to be contained. When a broad front has to be held with a weak force, it is a good plan to post the troops in groups. Of the attack as well as of the defense it may be said, that the skillful combination of the offensive and defensive advantages of a piece of ground is a sign of good leadership. (Austerlitz). Frequently, however, after an action is over, the assault that penetrated a line is called the main attack, and the one that failed, a demonstration. An organization fighting alone will generally begin an action by deploying on a narrow front; it will protect its flanks by distribution in depth; and, finally, mass troops at the decisive point in readiness to make the assault. The force making an assault in attack or a counter-attack in defense cannot be strong enough. Another factor that must be considered in deciding upon the frontage is the task which a force is to perform, _i.e._, whether it is to make an attack or to stand on the defensive; whether it is to fight a delaying action or is to withdraw. The object of distribution in depth is to keep the firing line constantly at the same strength; this requires stronger reinforcements in attack (owing to the greater losses), than in defense, and leads, consequently, to a contraction of the front. The number of troops which will be required to hold a given piece of ground must be determined separately in each case. The strength of the fighting line depends upon the effect of the hostile fire. Military history tells us how many troops the leader sent into action in order to gain the victory, but it seldom gives us a clue as to the number of troops that might have sufficed in the particular case. In deploying from route column in a rencontre, the leading battalion may be fully engaged by the time the next one arrives on the battlefield. In such cases, the tactical situation may require the employment of longer firing lines than would be deemed proper for the size of the command when making a more serious attack. (Par. 357 German I. D. R.). The assailant should then endeavor to throw the enemy, who is likewise advancing, on the defensive. The situation is similar to that in which an advance guard has to cover the main body’s debouchment from a defile. At =Nachod=, five Prussian battalions, which had only two companies in reserve, fought on a front of 2500 m. from 8 A. M. until noon.