The difference between a deliberately planned attack and a rencontre is most clearly apparent in the conduct of the advance guard. Its task is to secure the prospective artillery position and to create favorable conditions for the combat of the main body. This requires that ground be gained to the front so as to enable the main body to deploy while moving forward. In addition, the advance guard should seize and hold important points, without, however, anticipating the intentions of the commander of the whole force. It is moreover desirable for the advance guard to interfere with the hostile deployment. Points lying on the flanks or in advance of the artillery position, especially if they command the latter, should be quickly seized; when necessary, the advance guard must fight for their possession. Its commander should quickly pick out the points that are important for this purpose; he should, by no means, be satisfied always to begin the fight where the point of the advance guard happens to be. Under certain circumstances the main body will have to concentrate for action farther to the rear so as to hasten the deployment and to take advantage of favorable terrain. When the enemy has an undeniable start in deployment, the commander may decide to let the opponent advance to the attack, and then bring about the decision by simultaneously launching his main body. Only thus can one in the long run avoid fighting superior numbers with an inferior force. (Par. 360 German I. D. R.). It is much easier to decide whether this or that point is of importance, than to answer the question as to whether the strength of the advance guard will suffice for the task of taking it. The reports of the cavalry in regard to the enemy’s strength and the composition and formation of his columns, will scarcely furnish an adequate basis for a pertinent answer to this question. Moreover, one will usually not be able to tell, until after the action has commenced, how far the hostile deployment has progressed. But, in any case, long hostile firing lines demand caution. However, a start in deployment is not indicated by the combat frontage alone. A factor of far greater importance is which force has been most successful in making preparations for going into action by developing its main body and by having artillery near at hand. It is artillery that clears up the situation. When an infantry division encounters a hostile force deployed on a front of 400-600 m., this does not necessarily mean that the entire division must systematically concentrate for action, as this would cause a considerable loss of time, thus giving the enemy a great advantage. _The general situation and the mission of a force are of greater importance for the commander’s decision, than the state of readiness for action of the opposing forces._ _Issue of orders._ See _Taktik_, V, p. 197.