Tactics, Volume 1 (of 2). Introduction and Formal Tactics of InfantryBalck, W. (William)
History
Tactics, Volume 1 (of 2). Introduction and Formal Tactics of Infantry
Balck, W. (William)
Military art and science; Tactics
The advance guard must be promptly informed of the intentions of the
commander (_i.e._, whether he intends to attack, to concentrate for
attack farther to the rear, or to let the enemy attack[338]) and of the
location of the prospective artillery position. The attack order should
be withheld until the combat of the advance guard has sufficiently
cleared the situation, but a development of the force should be ordered
at once.
[338] Par. 350 German I. D. R.
The advanced detachments should endeavor to gain a start in deployment
over the enemy and cover the advancing artillery in front and flank,
by quickly deploying strong firing lines and pushing machine guns to
the front. After they have done this, they should promptly advance
to the attack. Through this, our firing line, while in the act of
deploying, runs the serious risk of suddenly encountering, at short
range, the fire of superior hostile troops, at a time when all the
troops approaching the field are still too far distant to increase its
fire power.[339] Whether the quickly formed firing lines should at once
move forward to the attack in a rencontre, depends upon the impressions
received by the commander. His dispositions should be such as to compel
the enemy to disclose his available forces at an early moment. Every
fighting line is so sensitive to fire simultaneously delivered against
its front and flank, that an attempt to turn the hostile position will
instantly force the enemy to take counter-measures. If the enemy is
unable to keep pace with us in deploying a firing line, if he is unable
to deploy skirmish lines as dense as ours, this state of affairs
should induce our commander to proceed to the attack; if the reverse
state of affairs exists, he should await the arrival of reinforcements.
But in order to obtain this insight into the existing situation the
troops must get close to the enemy. Such an insight into the hostile
dispositions cannot be gained at long range. The extent of a hostile
position may perhaps be determined at long range with the best field
glasses, but the strength and power of resistance of the enemy can
never be gauged in this manner. If one threatens to push an attack
home, however, the enemy will be compelled to show his hand. When
opposed by an enemy whose strength is unknown, it will unquestionably
be necessary to approach to the extreme limit of short ranges. From
here the dispositions of the enemy may be clearly recognized, and, in
addition, at 600-800 m., a firing line that has made a lodgment in
some feature of the terrain will not as yet be exposed to annihilating
losses. Misconceptions are scarcely to be avoided in such a situation.
One must trust to luck and take some risks. On the other hand, the
training of the infantry should afford the assurance that it will not
give up the position it has once reached; it should firmly hold the
ground gained, and persevere.[340]
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