“These officers stated, moreover, that the sight of danger approaching ever closer without their being able to ward it off effectively, caused great depression and alarm among their troops; for the Boers, utilizing every available rock in crawling over the plain, presented such an unfavorable target that the British fire had had very little effect, while they themselves had been constantly exposed to the Boer fire. All this, they claimed, had contributed to unnerve their troops.”[91] [91] _Supplement No. 8 to Militär-Wochenblatt_, 1900. _Spionskop_, in _Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften_, 34/35, p. 59. =Lessons of the Boer War=: “The rushes * * * were of variable length, according to the intensity of the hostile fire; they varied from 30 to 80 m. According to the opinion of many British officers it was exceedingly difficult to induce skirmishers to rise and rush forward under hostile fire; but that once upon their feet, it became necessary to push the attack forward as far as possible regardless of the increased losses entailed by the longer rushes.”[92] [92] _Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften_, 33, p. 69. One who fought on the Boer side reports as follows in regard to the British advance by rushes: “The men rose gradually and hesitatingly. This gave the attentively watching enemy time to pour a well directed fire upon the last men who arose. Thus even short rushes made by long lines became generally too costly to be executed. Smaller groups, on the other hand, were able to move with startling rapidity. * * * Every sudden interruption of the firing that might attract the enemy’s attention should therefore be carefully avoided, but, as a rule, this is possible only when the advancing units are small.” The British Regulations of 1896 prescribe rushes of 30-40 m., and those published immediately after the war (1902) prescribe rushes of 70-90 m., but the rush is to continue only while the surprise of the enemy lasts. Russo-Japanese War. In the Japanese army, the 5th Infantry Division employed short, and very short, rushes by preference, while other divisions of the 1st Army as a rule preferred long rushes. From an English work we obtain the following data in regard to the length of rushes and the expenditure of ammunition per rifle during halts between consecutive rushes in the engagement on the Shiliho on October 12th, 1904, at ranges beginning with 1,000 m. From the table it appears that after gaining the superiority of fire, beginning with the fifth rush, at about 625 m. from the enemy, the length of the rushes increased; the last 400 m. were covered in one rush as the enemy withdrew from his position.