In contrast with these examples of long rushes, almost every obstinate engagement with an unshaken enemy showed that “every step forward” had to be literally gained by the impulse imparted by the arrival of small, fresh detachments, that the rushes often faltered after only 20-30 paces, and that frequently nothing remained but to work forward individually. (See pp. 76 and 87 _supra_.) The frontal attacks made at =Wörth=, at the Roten Berg at =Spicheren=, opposite =Flavigny=, on August 16th, 1870, and opposite the gravel pits of =Point du Jour=, on August 18th, 1870, etc. In the Russo-Turkish war, the engagement at the mills north of =Lovtcha=, the fight for the possession of the Green Hill ridges south of =Plevna=, and the fight during the advance from the west and southwest against the large work of =Gorni Dubniac=, show how rushes, repeatedly attempted at short ranges, faltered after only a few paces. “On a signal given by Ljapunov, which was to be repeated by all the officers, the men were to rush forward immediately. Just before the movement began, the Turks opened the usual incessant fire, and the simultaneous advance of so many squads was of course absolutely impossible. The rushes were, therefore, always made by groups of 2-3 men. These groups would rise, one in this company, one in that, run forward a few steps, and then throw themselves down again.”[98] [98] PUSYREWSKI, _Die russische Garde im Kriege, 1877-78_, p. 127. The attacks on =Railway Hill= and on =Hart’s Hill= (February 1900), on the =Tugela=, show an endeavor to advance at first by long rushes, then by rushes gradually diminishing in length, the infantry finally working itself forward by twos and threes for the purpose of reaching the last firing position from which the final assault could be made.[99] [99] _Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften_, 34/35, pp. 129, 139. _The Times History of the War in South Africa_, III, p. 539. (c) Reinforcing the Firing Line.