It has been wisely remarked by that great illustrator of the machinery of governments, (Montesquieu) that there can be no liberty where the legislative, executive, and judicial powers, or any two of them, are united in the same person or body of persons. See Spirit of Laws, in reference to the English Constitution. If any corroboration of this high authority is needed, I will refer to Mr. Jefferson, and the writers of that invaluable text book, the Federalist. Mr. Jefferson, in his Notes on Virginia, page 195, says the concentration of legislative, executive and judicial powers in the same hands, is precisely the definition of despotism. And in the Federalist, page 261, it is said, "the accumulation of these powers in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, is the very definition of tyranny." In the same great work it is clearly demonstrated, that if each department is not so fortified in its powers as to prevent infringement by the others, the constitution which creates them all will be worth no more than the parchment upon which it is written. So important was it deemed by all the states of the Union to keep these departments distinct, and in different hands, that it has been specially provided for in all their constitutions. See the constitutions of the different States. And yet in the face of all this wisdom and experience, and contrary to every thing that is republican in its nature, the framers of the Mexican constitution have reserved to Congress the sole power of construing the constitutionality of its acts. This, it will be readily seen, is an entire nullification of the judiciary in all constitutional matters, and leaves the rights of the people and the constitution itself without any other security than what is to be found in the virtue, patriotism and intelligence of Congress. What slender reliances, where the liberties and happiness of a nation are concerned! If in the United States Congress should transcend its powers in the passage of a law, the courts would declare it null and void, and bring back Congress to a constitutional discharge of its duties. But if the same thing were attempted in Mexico, Congress would re-enact the law, declare it constitutional, and imprison the judge for his presumption. It appears then, that the Mexican constitution of 1824 contains within itself the seeds of its own destruction,--for the accumulation of legislative and judicial powers in Congress, and the enabling of that body to violate the constitution at will, renders it of no more avail than "a sounding brass or tinkling cymbal." It will be no alleviation, says Mr. Jefferson, in his work above quoted, page 195, that in the case of Congress unlimited powers are vested in a plurality of hands. One hundred or two hundred despots are surely as oppressive as one. Let those who doubt it turn their eyes on the republic of Venice. In the next place I will show, that independent of this