The Academic Questions, Treatise De Finibus, and Tusculan Disputations, of M.T. Cicero, With a Sketch of the Greek Philosophers Mentioned by CiceroCicero, Marcus Tullius
Philosophy
The Academic Questions, Treatise De Finibus, and Tusculan Disputations, of M.T. Cicero, With a Sketch of the Greek Philosophers Mentioned by Cicero
Cicero, Marcus Tullius
Ethics -- Early works to 1800; Happiness -- Early works to 1800
Imagine, on the other hand, any one worn out with the greatest pains of
mind and body which can possibly befal a man, without any hope being held
out to him that they will hereafter be lighter, when, besides, he has no
pleasure whatever either present or expected; what can be spoken of or
imagined more miserable than this? But if a life entirely filled with
pains is above all things to be avoided, then certainly that is the
greatest of evils to live in pain. And akin to this sentiment is the
other, that it is the most extreme good to live with pleasure. For our
mind has no other point where it can stop as at a boundary; and all fears
and distresses are referable to pain: nor is there anything whatever
besides, which of its own intrinsic nature can make us anxious or grieve
us. Moreover, the beginnings of desiring and avoiding, and indeed
altogether of everything which we do, take their rise either in pleasure
or pain. And as this is the case, it is plain that everything which is
right and laudable has reference to this one object of living with
pleasure. And since that is the highest, or extreme, or greatest good,
which the Greeks call τέλος, because it is referred to nothing else
itself, but everything is referred to it, we must confess that the highest
good is to live agreeably.
XIII. And those who place this in virtue alone, and, being caught by the
splendour of a name, do not understand what nature requires, will be
delivered from the greatest blunder imaginable if they will listen to
Epicurus. For unless those excellent and beautiful virtues which your
school talks about produced pleasure, who would think them either
praiseworthy or desirable? For as we esteem the skill of physicians not
for the sake of the art itself, but from our desire for good health,—and
as the skill of the pilot, who has the knowledge how to navigate a vessel
well, is praised with reference to its utility, and not to his ability,—so
wisdom, which should be considered the art of living, would not be sought
after if it effected nothing; but at present it is sought after because it
is, as it were, the efficient cause of pleasure, which is a legitimate
object of desire and acquisition. And now you understand what pleasure I
mean, so that what I say may not be brought into odium from my using an
unpopular word. For as the chief annoyances to human life proceed from
ignorance of what things are good and what bad, and as by reason of that
mistake men are often deprived of the greatest pleasures, and tortured by
the most bitter grief of mind, we have need to exercise wisdom, which, by
removing groundless alarms and vain desires, and by banishing the rashness
of all erroneous opinions, offers herself to us as the surest guide to
pleasure. For it is wisdom alone which expels sorrow from our minds, and
prevents our shuddering with fear: she is the instructress who enables us
to live in tranquillity, by extinguishing in us all vehemence of desire.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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