The Academic Questions, Treatise De Finibus, and Tusculan Disputations, of M.T. Cicero, With a Sketch of the Greek Philosophers Mentioned by CiceroCicero, Marcus Tullius
Philosophy
The Academic Questions, Treatise De Finibus, and Tusculan Disputations, of M.T. Cicero, With a Sketch of the Greek Philosophers Mentioned by Cicero
Cicero, Marcus Tullius
Ethics -- Early works to 1800; Happiness -- Early works to 1800
For desires are insatiable, and ruin not only individuals but entire
families, and often overturn the whole state. From desires arise hatred,
dissensions, quarrels, seditions, wars. Nor is it only out of doors that
these passions vent themselves, nor is it only against others that they
run with blind violence; but they are often shut up, as it were, in the
mind, and throw that into confusion with their disagreements.
And the consequence of this is, to make life thoroughly wretched; so that
the wise man is the only one who, having cut away all vanity and error,
and removed it from him, can live contented within the boundaries of
nature, without melancholy and without fear. For what diversion can be
either more useful or more adapted for human life than that which Epicurus
employed? For he laid it down that there were three kinds of desires; the
first, such as were natural and necessary; the second, such as were
natural but not necessary; the third, such as were neither natural nor
necessary. And these are all such, that those which are necessary are
satisfied without much trouble or expense: even those which are natural
and not necessary, do not require a great deal, because nature itself
makes the riches, which are sufficient to content it, easy of acquisition
and of limited quantity: but as for vain desires, it is impossible to find
any limit to, or any moderation in them.
XIV. But if we see that the whole life of man is thrown into disorder by
error and ignorance; and that wisdom is the only thing which can relieve
us from the sway of the passions and the fear of danger, and which can
teach us to bear the injuries of fortune itself with moderation, and which
shows us all the ways which lead to tranquillity and peace; what reason is
there that we should hesitate to say that wisdom is to be sought for the
sake of pleasure, and that folly is to be avoided on account of its
annoyances? And on the same principle we shall say that even temperance is
not to be sought for its own sake, but because it brings peace to the
mind, and soothes and tranquillizes them by what I may call a kind of
concord. For temperance is that which warns us to follow reason in
desiring or avoiding anything. Nor is it sufficient to decide what ought
to be done, and what ought not; but we must adhere to what has been
decided. But many men, because they are enfeebled and subdued the moment
pleasure comes in sight, and so are unable to keep and adhere to the
determination they have formed, give themselves up to be bound hand and
foot by their lusts, and do not foresee what will happen to them; and in
that way, on account of some pleasure which is trivial and unnecessary,
and which might be procured in some other manner, and which they could
dispense with without annoyance, incur terrible diseases, and injuries,
and disgrace, and are often even involved in the penalties of the legal
tribunals of their country.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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