The Academic Questions, Treatise De Finibus, and Tusculan Disputations, of M.T. Cicero, With a Sketch of the Greek Philosophers Mentioned by CiceroCicero, Marcus Tullius
Philosophy
The Academic Questions, Treatise De Finibus, and Tusculan Disputations, of M.T. Cicero, With a Sketch of the Greek Philosophers Mentioned by Cicero
Cicero, Marcus Tullius
Ethics -- Early works to 1800; Happiness -- Early works to 1800
This, however, is their last resource. They demand that one should make an
exception with regard to these points which are inexplicable. I give my
vote for their going to some tribune of the people; for they shall never
obtain this exception from me. In truth, when they cannot prevail on
Epicurus, who despises and ridicules the whole science of dialectics, to
grant this proposition to be true, which we may express thus—“Hermachus
will either be alive to-morrow or he will not;” when the dialecticians lay
it down that every disjunctive proposition, such as “either yes or no” is
not only true but necessary; you may see how cautious he is, whom they
think slow. For, says he, if I should grant that one of the two
alternatives is necessary, it will then be necessary either that Hermachus
should be alive to-morrow, or not. But there is no such necessity in the
nature of things. Let the dialecticians then, that is to say, Antiochus
and the Stoics, contend with him, for he upsets the whole science of
dialectics.
For if a disjunctive proposition made up of contraries, (I call those
propositions contraries when one affirms and the other denies,) if, I say,
such a disjunctive can be false, then no one is ever true. But what
quarrel have they with me who am following their system? When anything of
that kind happened, Carneades used to joke in this way:—“If I have drawn
my conclusion correctly, I gain the cause: if incorrectly, Diogenes shall
pay back a mina;” for he had learnt dialectics of that Stoic, and a mina
was the pay of the dialecticians.
I, therefore, follow that system which I learnt from Antiochus; and I find
no reason why I should judge “If it does shine, it does shine” to be true,
because I have learnt that everything which is connected with itself is
true; and yet not judge “If you lie, you lie,” to be connected with itself
in the same manner. Either, therefore, I must judge both this and that to
be true, or, if I may not judge this to be true, then I cannot judge that
to be.
XXXI. However, to pass over all those prickles, and all that tortuous kind
of discussion, and to show what we are:—after having explained the whole
theory of Carneades, all the quibbles of Antiochus will necessarily fall
to pieces. Nor will I say anything in such a way as to lead any one to
suspect that anything is invented by me. I will take what I say from
Clitomachus, who was with Carneades till his old age, a man of great
shrewdness, (indeed, he was a Carthaginian,) and very studious and
diligent. And he has written four books on the subject of withholding
assent; but what I am going to say is taken out of the first.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account