The Afghan War of 1879-80: Being a Complete Narrative of the Capture of Cabul, the Siege of Sherpur, the Battle of Ahmed Khel, the Brilliant March to Candahar, and the Defeat of Ayub Khan, with the Operations on the Helmund, and the Settlement with Abdur Rahman KhanHensman, Howard
History
The Afghan War of 1879-80: Being a Complete Narrative of the Capture of Cabul, the Siege of Sherpur, the Battle of Ahmed Khel, the Brilliant March to Candahar, and the Defeat of Ayub Khan, with the Operations on the Helmund, and the Settlement with Abdur Rahman Khan
On the 27th, Sir F. Roberts had moved his head-quarters from Ali Kheyl
westwards, and on the same day the Amir, with a considerable escort,
arrived at Kushi. He was received with every mark of respect, and a
guard of honour, furnished by the 92nd Highlanders, was placed at his
tent. His camp was pitched at a little distance from the British army.
Having joined General Roberts at Ali Kheyl on the evening of September
26th, I may take up the story of the advance from about that period. I
will therefore give my letters as they were published at the time:—
ALI KHEYL, _28th September_.
The unexpected news of the arrival of the Amir Yakub Khan at Kushi last
night has been received with general satisfaction, as affairs are much
simplified as regards the military position. There has been much doubt
all along as to the sincerity of Yakub’s protestations, and it was not
easy to determine the line of action when Cabul should be finally
reached. But the Amir’s authority has plainly crumbled to the dust in
his capital; and, if not a fugitive, he must have come as a suppliant to
us to reinstate him on the throne, at the same time that we avenge the
Massacre of the Embassy. It seems far more probable, however, that he is
a fugitive; for it is stated that Cabul is in a state of anarchy, which
can only mean that the populace have fraternized with the mutinous
troops and have driven out a sovereign who had made terms with the
Kafirs. If this be really so, the fate of the city, in case any
opposition is shown when our army moves forward, should be sealed. The
only argument an Afghan understands is direct and severe punishment for
offences committed, and the punishment should now be dealt out without
stint, even if Cabul has to be sacked. Not a man in the force that is
now about to make the final advance would feel other than the keenest
pleasure in seeing Cabul burn, for it is hopeless to expect an armed
rabble, such as that which now holds the city, to show a steady front
when General Roberts’s army closes with them. They lack leaders to
direct their movements, and though arms and ammunition may be plentiful
in their midst, their organization is about equal to that of a European
mob suddenly placed in power after a long period of strict government.
Their capacity for mischief is as limited as that of any other rabble,
for their future movements are all dependent upon outside influences. If
left to their own will, they would probably split up into factions, of
which the strongest would eventually sweep away all rivals; but when
menaced by a stronger power, they must either dissolve, or by sheer
doggedness attempt to dispute possession of that which they have gained.
The Cabul mutineers are not of a type which “die but never surrender,”
and although they may risk a brush with the British forces, they will
most likely seek safety in flight before any severe thrashing can be
given them.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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