The Afghan War of 1879-80: Being a Complete Narrative of the Capture of Cabul, the Siege of Sherpur, the Battle of Ahmed Khel, the Brilliant March to Candahar, and the Defeat of Ayub Khan, with the Operations on the Helmund, and the Settlement with Abdur Rahman KhanHensman, Howard
History
The Afghan War of 1879-80: Being a Complete Narrative of the Capture of Cabul, the Siege of Sherpur, the Battle of Ahmed Khel, the Brilliant March to Candahar, and the Defeat of Ayub Khan, with the Operations on the Helmund, and the Settlement with Abdur Rahman Khan
the stream—at this time reduced to very small dimensions, by being
largely drawn upon for irrigation purposes in the Chardeh Valley—but
begins at once on the opposite side of the river. A strong tower, with a
base of stones fifteen feet high, raised on the solid rock, is the
starting point on this, the northern side of the river, and the wall
zig-zags up just in the same way as that in continuation of the upper
Bala Hissar. The line of fortification extends along the hill top, and
then turns down for some distance along a spur facing towards Sherpur.
On the crest of this ridge (the Asmai Heights), three white standards
were flying near the guns of the enemy, who had one heavy piece on the
summit, the report of which made the bark of the mountain guns sound
quite contemptible. The line of fire on both sides was at right angles
to the bed of the Cabul River, the shells flying over the gorge and
bursting on the opposing heights. From our position in the plain below
we could watch the artillery and judge pretty accurately as to the fall
of the shells, and it was annoying to see that as it was “end-on”
firing, the enemy were receiving but little injury. Their policy was
plainly to hold on till nightfall and to attempt to escape under cover
of darkness; and as the sun sank slowly behind us, it became obvious
that unless the infantry attack was soon delivered, they would succeed
only too well. Our chagrin was great that there were not guns with our
cavalry, as we could see men in little clusters of 50 or 100 lying under
the lee of the rocks on our side of the ridge, perfectly sheltered from
General Baker’s shells. General Massy had applied for horse artillery
before leaving Beni Hissar; but it was reported that the country he
would have to pass over was cut up by deep irrigation channels which
would hinder the guns from keeping up with the cavalry. It was decided
therefore not to send out artillery. With a couple of R.H.A. guns we
could have made the enemy’s camp and the hillside quite untenable, and
the 2,800 men gathered there would either have had to come down into the
plain, where our cavalry would have chosen their own ground to charge
them, or to take refuge in Cabul city, which they could easily have
reached. An old native officer, a Cabuli, who saw service in the Mutiny,
was much struck with our plan of cutting off the retreat; and when he
saw the cavalry debouch into the Chardeh plain, he said in his fervent
thankfulness:—“God has delivered these _budmashes_ into your hands even
as the Embassy was delivered into theirs.” And it certainly did seem as
if these three regiments, which were said to have been chief in the
attack upon the handful of men under Sir Louis Cavagnari in the Bala
Hissar, were about to be exterminated. But night fell, and still our
infantry attack was not delivered. General Massy ordered his videttes
and the chain of cavalry to be maintained until it was quite dark, so as
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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