The Afghan War of 1879-80: Being a Complete Narrative of the Capture of Cabul, the Siege of Sherpur, the Battle of Ahmed Khel, the Brilliant March to Candahar, and the Defeat of Ayub Khan, with the Operations on the Helmund, and the Settlement with Abdur Rahman KhanHensman, Howard
History
The Afghan War of 1879-80: Being a Complete Narrative of the Capture of Cabul, the Siege of Sherpur, the Battle of Ahmed Khel, the Brilliant March to Candahar, and the Defeat of Ayub Khan, with the Operations on the Helmund, and the Settlement with Abdur Rahman Khan
to induce the enemy to believe the cordon would be maintained during the
night; but he would not run the risk, in such an awkward country, of his
men being shot down in detail. He therefore withdrew them eventually
within two or three of the rude forts in the plain and waited for
daylight. It seemed almost hopeless to intercept in the darkness men who
had a valley six or seven miles across, with hills on either side, to
escape by. That they did escape is now a cause of much heartburning in
the force. If, like Joshua, we could have made the sun stand still, say,
for only two hours, the day would have been as grand a success as the
6th at Charasia; as it was, it can only be looked upon as one of great
disappointment to all concerned.
The only troops available for despatch with General Baker were 320 of
the 92nd Highlanders, two companies of the 72nd Highlanders, and seven
companies of the 23rd Pioneers. With these were two mountain guns and
one Gatling. The road up to the ridge commanding the Bala Hissar and
the passage over the Kotal down into the Chardeh Valley were so
difficult, that although this force moved out of Beni Hissar at noon,
it was a quarter to four before the mountain guns got into action, and
it was some time later before the 92nd Highlanders reached the village
to the west of Dehmazung. The enemy were in greater force than was
expected, and as the 92nd men were unsupported, they were ordered to
wait for reinforcements before making any attack. They were directed
to take up a position on a spur of the Sherderwaza Heights, parallel
to the Cabul River, and this they did without loss, although the enemy
opened fire from two breech-loading field-pieces in their camp. The
shells and round shot were pitched too high, and greatly amused our
men. Marksmen were posted at sheltered points, and their aim was so
good that the Afghans soon retired from these two guns, leaving them
in the open. The two companies of the 72nd were at this time on the
hillside nearest to Beni Hissar, and the 23rd was in reserve. A gun in
the tower I have mentioned fired occasionally, and the Gatling was
tried at this; but the drum hitched after a few rounds, and the gun
had to cease firing. General Baker had made up his mind to attack the
instant his reinforcements—consisting of a wing of the 67th, two
companies of the 5th Ghoorkas, and four more mountain guns—arrived.
These, however, did not reach him until half-past five, and it was
then quite hopeless to think of storming the heights in the dusk. The
troops accordingly bivouacked where they stood, and a very cold night
they had of it. General Macpherson arrived at 6.30 A.M. with the
remainder of the 67th, the 28th P.N.I, and four horse artillery guns
on elephants. He started with some infantry and guns to follow General
Massy.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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