in their fullest sense, using his name only to smooth away difficulties that would otherwise have to be overcome by force. This assumption has had to be made for the simple reason that Yakub Khan is too weak and vacillating to exercise the authority which we have so ostentatiously recognized, and his ministers too corrupt to be trusted near his person. But beyond the immediate exercise of military power in Cabul and its neighbourhood, we can do nothing. There is no responsible Government which could take out of our hands the task of hunting up the men who have been guilty of treachery and murder; and as our first duty is to our dead Envoy and not to the living Amir, it follows that our present work is that of judges and not of king-makers. That work has to be done, and we are doing it unflinchingly, and until it is completed, the Amir must be content to accept his position as a sovereign in leading strings. By the time we have dealt with all the culprits that can be captured, the cloud of suspicion now resting upon Yakub Khan will either have deepened or been dissipated, and our second duty of punishing or aiding him under his difficulties will then have to be fulfilled. The drift of evidence seems now fairly in his favour, _i.e._, he was not involved in the work of Nek Mahomed and Kushdil Khan; and taking it as most probable that he will finally be convicted of nothing worse than weakness, it will remain with us to say if he is again worthy of our trust. With his army dispersed, and his artillery (which goes for so much in the eyes of Asiatic nations) in our hands, the only semblance of power he can derive will be reflected from our arms—if we reinstate him in good faith. And if his weakness is held as our justification for reducing him to the rank of a political pensioner, comfortably housed in India, are we to fit out his successor with new war-trappings, which may at any moment be seized by mutinous regiments and turned against us at the first opportunity? More unlikely things have occurred than this; but unless our army carries back with it to India the trophies it now boasts of, there will be sad disappointment in every mind. I have dwelt with great pertinacity upon the political side of the Afghan question as it is developing under the walls of Cabul, because our late successes may have overshadowed the great problem which has now to be worked out, viz., what are the future relations between India and Afghanistan to be? From what I have written, a fair judgment may be formed as to whether the sanguine view, that the line of policy laid down in the Treaty of Gundamak still remains good, can be consistently maintained. The arrest of the Mustaufi, the Wazir, and their two intimate friends, has raised the revolt in Cabul far above the level of a local _émeute_ of discontented soldiers. ------------------------------------ CHAPTER VIII.