The Afghan War of 1879-80: Being a Complete Narrative of the Capture of Cabul, the Siege of Sherpur, the Battle of Ahmed Khel, the Brilliant March to Candahar, and the Defeat of Ayub Khan, with the Operations on the Helmund, and the Settlement with Abdur Rahman Khan — John Shaqi
The Afghan War of 1879-80: Being a Complete Narrative of the Capture of Cabul, the Siege of Sherpur, the Battle of Ahmed Khel, the Brilliant March to Candahar, and the Defeat of Ayub Khan, with the Operations on the Helmund, and the Settlement with Abdur Rahman KhanHensman, Howard
History
The Afghan War of 1879-80: Being a Complete Narrative of the Capture of Cabul, the Siege of Sherpur, the Battle of Ahmed Khel, the Brilliant March to Candahar, and the Defeat of Ayub Khan, with the Operations on the Helmund, and the Settlement with Abdur Rahman Khan
Having secured the Shutargardan, Sir Frederick Roberts cast about for
means to complete his transport, it being intended to move 6,000 men
upon Cabul with as little delay as possible. With the usual carelessness
which marks the operations of Indian armies, and perhaps with a desire
to curtail expenditure, the transport of the Kurram Valley Field Force
had, upon Cavagnari’s departure for Cabul, been allowed to dwindle down
to insignificant proportions. There were in the Valley, when the news of
the Massacre was received, only 1,500 mules, 500 sickly camels, and 800
pack-bullocks. These were just sufficient to enable the Commissariat
Department to furnish supplies to the winter garrison of the Valley.
Without loss of time all the available animals in Peshawur and near the
frontier were ordered to be sent to Ali Kheyl, and eventually the army
was provided with almost 2,000 mules, between 700 and 800 camels, and
upwards of 600 bullocks.[3] The Gajis, Turis, and local Ghilzais were
induced to send in animals with drivers, and this “local carriage” was
of great service. Padshah Khan, the most influential of the Ghilzai
chiefs, declared himself willing to aid us in the collection of
supplies, and his friendship at this critical moment was all-important.
On the 14th of September the Nawab Sir Gholam Hassan Khan, who had
started from Candahar to join Cavagnari at Cabul, reached the
Shutargardan. He had heard news of the Massacre and had turned off the
Ghazni Road and made for our most advanced post. The fact of his
non-molestation on the road proved that the Logar Valley was quiet, and
this was confirmed by a reconnaissance on the 16th, when General Baker
went as far as the Shinkai Kotal, half-way between Kushi and the
Shutargardan. On the 22nd the Mangals to the number of 200 or 300,
raided upon a small convoy carrying telegraph stores near Karatiga, east
of the Pass, killed six sepoys of the escort (originally only eleven
men), and twenty-one coolies and linesmen. They also succeeded in
carrying off eighty-four mules. This showed that our convoys would
probably he attacked daily, and General Baker ordered that no escort
should be less than twenty-five armed men to 100 transport animals.
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Footnote 3:
On October 14th, at Cabul, the returns were:—Mules, 1,973; camels,
675; bullocks, 604; and 230 yabus (ponies purchased in Cabul).
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CHAPTER II.
Letter from the Amir—Baker’s Advance to Kushi—Arrival of Yakub Khan in
the British Camp—The State of Cabul—Excitement along the Line of
Communication—Departure of the Last Convoy from Ali Kheyl—Narrow
Escape of Sir F. Roberts—The Amir’s Attempt to delay the
Advance—Durbar at Kushi—The Advance ordered—Instructions to the
Troops.
The news of the preparations at Ali Kheyl and the Shutargardan reached
Cabul very rapidly, and a letter from General Roberts to the Amir was
also safely received. In reply Yakub Khan wrote as follows:—
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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