Officers of the Army and Navy were frank in insisting that the defense of the United States was adequately provided for. (See testimony of General Nelson A. Miles. _Congressional Record_, February 3, 1916, p. 2265.) Still the preparedness campaign continued with vigor. Congressman Clyde H. Tavenner in his speech, "The Navy League Unmasked," showed why. He gave facts like those appearing in George R. Kirkpatrick's book, "War, What For"; in F. C. Howe's "Why War," and in J. A. Hobson's "Imperialism," showing that, in the words of an English authority, "patriotism at from 10 to 15 per cent is a temptation for the best of citizens." Tavenner established the connection between the preparedness campaign and those who were making profits out of the powder business, the nickel business, the copper business, and the steel business, interlocked through interlocking directorates; then he established the connection between the Navy League and the firm of J. P. Morgan & Co., 23 Wall St., New York. Regarding this connection, Congressman Tavenner said, "The Navy League upon close examination would appear to be little more than a branch office of the house of J. P. Morgan & Co., and a general sales promotion bureau for the various armor and munition makers and the steel, nickel, copper and zinc interests."[45] The preparedness movement came from the business interests. It was fostered and financed by the plutocrats. It was their first successful effort at winning public confidence, and so well was it managed that millions of Americans fell into line, fired by the love of the flag and the world-old devotion to family and fireside. 5. _Patriots_ From preparedness to patriotism was an easy step. The preparedness advocates had evoked the spirit of the founders of American democracy and worked upon the emotions of the people until it was generally understood that those who favored preparedness were patriots. Plutocratic patriotism was accepted by the press, the pulpit, the college, and every other important channel of public information in the United States. Editors, ministers, professors and lawyers proclaimed it as though it were their own. Randolph Bourne, in a brilliant article (_Seven Arts_, July, 1917) reminds his readers of "the virtuous horror and stupefaction when they read the manifesto of their ninety-three German colleagues in defense of the war. To the American academic mind of 1914 defense of war was inconceivable. From Bernhardi it recoiled as from a blasphemy, little dreaming that two years later would find it creating its own cleanly reasons for imposing military service on the country and for talking of the rough rude currents of health and regeneration that war would send through the American body politic. They would have thought any one mad who talked of shipping American men by the hundreds of thousands--conscripts--to die on the fields of France...."