From the colonial system of legislatures by which all the powers of government were at times exercised to the modern American State, with its professed division of them into three parts, and assignment of each to a distinct department, was a long step. So far as the United States were concerned, the weakness of the government under the Articles of Confederation had been universally acknowledged and was generally thought to come in part from throwing whatever powers the States had granted, in a mass, into the hands of the Continental Congress. Nevertheless, the Constitution of the United States is not framed upon the principles of a strict tripartite division. It places the executive power in the hands of the President, all the legislative powers which were granted by it in Congress, and the judicial power in certain courts; but it does not follow the earlier State Constitutions in declaring that whatever was vested in either of these three depositaries was and must always be different in kind from that vested in any other of them. On this point Virginia set the fashion, but the sonorous phrase of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 is the most familiar, in its declaration (Part the First, Art. XXX) that "in the government of this commonwealth, the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them; the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them; the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them; to the end it may be a government of laws, and not of men."[Footnote: The last declaration of purpose was taken from Harrington's _Oceana_, in which it is said that while a monarchy is an empire of men, "a commonwealth is an empire of laws and not of men." Works, London ed., 35, 42, 224.] It was from an unwillingness to commit themselves to such a principle that the people of Connecticut and Rhode Island preferred for many years to be governed in the old way by their legislatures, without a written constitution. During this period, the General Assembly of Connecticut repeatedly exercised the power of setting aside judgments of courts, and its right to do so was sustained by the Supreme Court of the United States.[Footnote: Calder _v._ Bull, 2 Root's Reports, 350; 3 Dallas' Reports, 386.] The courts of the United States were called upon at an early day to determine how far Congress could invest them with functions that were not judicial or not to be performed in a judicial manner. An act was passed requiring the Circuit Courts to pass upon claims for invalid pensions, their decisions to be subject to review by Congress. The performance of this duty was declined, and the attempt to put a judgment of a court under the control of the legislature made the refusal so plainly proper that the act was repealed at the next session.[Footnote: Hayburn's Case, 2 Dallas' Reports, 409.]