A great impetus was given to feeling for Cuba and against Spain by the explosion of the _Maine_ in Havana Harbor about 9:30 P.M., February 15th. Two months, however, were yet to pass before war was declared, though at the last moment Spain had acceded to all our demands. While our diplomacy may thus be said to have been not entirely “correct,” President McKinley may be ruled to have been wise in cutting the Gordian knot by war, which his message of April 11, 1898, practically did in referring the whole subject to Congress. The joint resolution passed and signed on April 20th, demanding that Spain should relinquish her authority in Cuba, was of course taken as a declaration of war by Spain, and April 21st was declared by Congress a few days later as the official date of its beginning. On the afternoon of May 21st Captain William T. Sampson, who was now in command of the North Atlantic station, and was with the flagship _New York_ off the reef at Key West where well-nigh all the available ships in the Atlantic were collected, received a telegram announcing his assignment to the command, with the rank of rear-admiral, an advancement only possible by selection by the President in time of war. This was the first indication of actual hostilities, but it was soon followed by another ordering to blockade immediately the coast of Cuba from Cardenas to Bahia Honda (a little west of Havana). Gathering during the night outside the reef (distant six miles from Key West) all the ships ready to move, the fleet early next morning was on its way, and by evening was off Havana, the searchlights of which were sweeping the sea in expectancy of the American fleet. Powerfully armed as were its batteries, they were, curiously enough, so disposed that they were open to attack from the southwest, with little possibility of return. It was Sampson’s eager wish to make this attack at once, and a battle-order had been drawn in anticipation of war, early in April, but the Navy Department in a letter of April 6th set its face so decidedly against the attempt, that Sampson had to yield. The department from the view of the necessity of preserving the fleet to meet Cervera was justified, but Sampson’s view, as later analysis of the situation showed, was correct. Had action been allowed, Havana would have been ours, without loss, on April 23d. In addition to Sampson’s command, a squadron made up of the _Brooklyn_, _Massachusetts_, and _Texas_ was stationed at Hampton Roads under Commodore Schley; and several others, among them the fast _Columbia_ and _Minneapolis_ and the cruiser _San Francisco_, were kept north to meet the clamor of the seacoast in general for protection. The public could not understand that the only real protection was concentration against, and the destruction of, the enemy’s fleet.