The claim of the Barbary powers was expressed in a statement of their envoy while in London in 1786, to our minister, John Adams: “That Turkey, Tripoli, Tunis, Algiers, and Morocco were the sovereigns of the Mediterranean; and that no nation could navigate that sea without a treaty of peace with them.”[13] Europe had practically accepted a situation of the most degrading kind; every nautical power paid tribute in money or presents and all had representatives among the Barbary slaves. Even as late as 1816, when the English finally acted, there were eighteen Englishmen among the slaves released by Lord Exmouth’s expedition. But England’s attitude had not been one of honor. There was no time when she might not have ended the foul situation. Franklin could say in a letter on July 25, 1783, to our secretary of foreign affairs: “I think it not improbable that these rovers may be privately encouraged by the English to fall upon us and to prevent our interfering in the carrying trade; for I have in London heard it is a maxim among the merchants, that if there were no Algiers it would be worth England’s while to build one. I wonder, however, that the rest of Europe do not combine to destroy those nests and secure commerce from their future piracies.”[14] Three years later John Adams, our minister in London, was writing Secretary Jay (February 17, 1786): “There are not wanting persons in England who will find means to stimulate this African [the Tripolitan envoy] to stir up his countrymen against American vessels.”[15] British statesmanship, then as ever, was jealous of rival commerce on the seas. Lord Sheffield, in a pamphlet on American commerce, could say: “It will not be in the interest of any of the great maritime powers to protect [Americans] from the Barbary States. If they know their interests, they will not encourage the Americans to be carriers--that the Barbary States are advantageous to the maritime powers is obvious.”