The American Occupation of the Philippines 1898-1912Blount, James H. (James Henderson)
History
The American Occupation of the Philippines 1898-1912
Blount, James H. (James Henderson)
Philippines -- History -- 1898-1946; Philippines -- Politics and government -- 1898-1935
General Anderson might have added that whenever the Admiral captured
prisoners from the Spaniards he would promptly turn them over to the
Filipinos--1300 at one clip in the month of June at Olongapo. [60]
These 1300 were men a German man-of-war prevented the Filipinos from
taking until Aguinaldo reported the matter to Admiral Dewey, whereupon,
he promptly sent Captain Coghlan with the Raleigh and another of his
ships to the scene of the trouble, and Captain Coghlan said to the
German "Hoch der Kaiser" etc. or words to that effect, and made him
go about his business and let our ally alone. Then Captain Coghlan
took the 1300 prisoners himself and turned them over to Aguinaldo by
direction of Admiral Dewey. The motive for, as well as the test of,
an alliance, is that the other fellow can bring into the partnership
something you lack. The navy had no way to keep prisoners of war. There
can be no doubt that if Admiral Dewey's original notions about meeting
the problems presented by his great victory of May 1, 1898, had been
followed, we never would have had any trouble with the Filipinos;
nor can there be any doubt that he made them his allies and used
them as such. They were very obedient allies at that, until they
saw the Washington Government was going to repudiate the "alliance,"
and withhold from them what they had a right to consider the object
and meaning of the alliance, if it meant anything.
The truth is, as Secretary of War Taft said in 1905, before the
National Geographic Society in Washington, "We blundered into
colonization." [61] As we have seen, Admiral Dewey repeatedly
expressed the opinion, in the summer of 1898, that the Filipinos
were far superior in intelligence to the Cubans and more capable
of self-government. He of course saw quite clearly then, when
he was sending home those commendations of Filipino fitness for
self-government, just as we have all come to realize since, that a
coaling station would be; the main thing we should need in that part
of the world in time of war; that Manila, being quite away from the
mainland of Asia, could never supersede Hong Kong as the gateway to
the markets of Asia, since neither shippers nor the carrying trade of
the world will ever see their way to unload cargo at Manila by way of
rehearsal before unloading on the mainland; and that the taking of the
islands was a dubious step from a financial standpoint, and a still
more dubious one from the strategic standpoint of defending them by
land, in the event of war with Japan, Germany, or any other first-class
power. At this late date, when the passions and controversies of that
period have long since subsided, is it not perfectly clear that after
he destroyed the Spanish fleet, Admiral Dewey not only dealt with the
Filipinos, until the army came out, substantially as Admiral Sampson
and General Shatter did with the Cubans, but also that he did all he
properly could to save President McKinley from the one great blunder
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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