Much diversity of opinion has prevailed on the subject of remuneration to professors. In some universities they are paid entirely by fees from the students. The objection urged against this, is, that the professor is too much dependent upon the student, and that this feeling may materially interfere with discipline. To those who consider that there ought to be no discipline in our universities--and strange as it may seem, such views were expressed in the convention--this plan of remuneration can be liable to no objection. Nor to institutions in which there are no resident pupils, like the one proposed in New-York, would the objection apply. On the contrary, the mode in which the professor receives his remuneration entirely from the students, the stimulus which is thus excited, and the feeling that his emoluments may be proportionate to his energy and success in conveying instruction, may have the most beneficial effect upon his exertions. Accordingly, we find the most meritorious application on the part of the professors in our great medical schools; and a degree of enthusiasm aroused, which might not be elicited were the mode of recompensing them other than it is. On the other hand, it has been maintained, that the professor should be in no wise dependent upon the student; that he should receive no fees, but be paid by a fixed salary. The objection urged against this system is, that there is here no stimulus, and that as the professor feels his income altogether independent of his exertions, he will relax in his efforts, neglect his duties, become inattentive to his own improvement, and uncourteous in his behaviour to the pupil. This is plausible in theory, and doubtless, has occasionally been found to be the fact. It is not likely to occur, however, if the professor be held rigidly responsible, and if the tenure of his office be on good behaviour, instead of for life. It is to be calculated, likewise, that every professor is a gentleman, and that the honour of the situation is a part of the emolument. These should be a sufficient guarantee that his duties will be performed energetically, and that his behaviour will be courteous. Should this not be the case, he is unfit for his situation, and the trustees should have moral courage enough to remove him. Experience, too, has, we think, sufficiently proved, that the evils of fixed salaries, under the tenure _dum bene se gesserit_, are more imaginary than real: some of the very best institutions are conducted upon this system, in various parts of Europe and of this country. On the whole, perhaps, where the students reside within the precincts, a combination of a fixed salary, of a sufficient amount to enable the professor to be, to a certain extent, independent of the student, with the payment of a fee from the student for tuition, is the most politic and satisfactory mode of remuneration. In this manner, he receives a certain stimulus to exertion, whilst other objections to both exclusive