=38th Infantry Regiment=: “_This crack regiment, under the able and energetic command of Colonel Mc. Alexander, displayed indomitable tenacity during the German attacks of July 15, 1918. Although attacked in front and outflanked on both sides, succeeded in holding its positions on the banks of the Marne, driving back an enemy numerically superior and capturing 200 prisoners._” =30th Infantry Regiment=: “_Under the energetic and able command of Colonel E. L. Buth, this old American regiment proved worthy of its glorious traditions by withstanding the principal onslaught of the German attack of July 15, 1918, on the front of the Army Corps to which it was attached. In spite of a very fierce bombardment and heavy losses, this regiment checked the German thrust and succeeded in recovering the whole of its positions, capturing over 200 prisoners._” =26th Division= =Major-General Clarence R. Edwards.= comprising: _51st Infantry Brigade_ _Brig.-Gen. Peter E. Traub_ _52nd_ “ “ “ “ _Chas. H. Cole_ _51st Artillery_ “ “ “ _Dwight E. Altman_ [Illustration: MAJOR-GENERAL CLARENCE R. EDWARDS. Commanding the 26th Division.] The Allies’ Counter-Offensive of July 18. It has been seen that, from the end of June to July 15, the French, by a series of local operations, had secured excellent positions of attack, by clearing the Villers-Cotterets Wood and re-occupying the eastern bank of the Savières. Moreover, the crisis due to the shortage of men had been overcome. In a prodigious effort Great Britain had re-constituted her armies; from eight to ten thousand American soldiers had been landing daily in France since March; the victory on the Piave enabled the Allies to retain a number of excellent Italian divisions in France, so that Marshal Foch was at last in a position to assume the initiative of manœuvre and offensive which until then had been impossible. The French armies, representing 80 per cent. of the Allied forces engaged in the battle, were as high-mettled as ever, the enemy’s push having been powerless either to wear them down or to break their spirit. They were, moreover, fully equipped with up-to-date armament, including large numbers of the all-important tank, by now a supreme weapon of attack. Their use on a large scale in support of the infantry counter-balanced the effect of the enemy’s asphyxiating gas and storm battalions. Signs of apprehension began to manifest themselves in the enemy camp, where several commanders of divisions on the Ourcq front in vain called attention to the precursory signs of the coming big attack. The German High Command, repeating Von Klück’s blunder of 1914 with regard to General Maunoury’s Army, misjudged the Allies’ strength and, so far from re-inforcing this sector, withdrew a number of reserve divisions in favour of the Marne and Champagne fronts.