The Anabasis of Alexander : $b or, The history of the wars and conquests of Alexander the Great — John Shaqi
The Anabasis of Alexander : $b or, The history of the wars and conquests of Alexander the GreatArrian
History
The Anabasis of Alexander : $b or, The history of the wars and conquests of Alexander the Great
Arrian
Alexander, the Great, 356 B.C.-323 B.C.; India -- History -- To 324 B.C.; Iran -- History -- To 640
On the following day he took the rest of his infantry, the archers, the
Agrianians, the Thracian cavalry, the royal squadron of the Companions,
and three other squadrons in addition, and set out for Miletus. At
his first assault he captured that which was called the outer city;
for the garrison had evacuated it. There he encamped and resolved to
blockade the inner city; for Hegesistratus, to whom the king Darius
had entrusted the command of the garrison in Miletus, kept on sending
letters before this to Alexander, offering to surrender Miletus to
him. But then, having regained his courage from the fact that the
Persian fleet was not far off, he made up his mind to preserve the
city for Darius. But Nicanor, the commander of the Grecian fleet,
anticipated the Persians by sailing into the port of Miletus three days
before they approached; and with 160 ships he anchored at the island
of Lade, which lies near Miletus.[154] The Persian ships arriving
too late, and the admirals discovering that Nicanor had occupied
the anchorage at Lade before them, they took moorings near Mount
Mycale.[155] Alexander had forestalled them in seizing the island, not
only by mooring his ships near it, but also by transporting into it the
Thracians and about 4,000 of the other auxiliary troops. The ships of
the foreigners were about 400 in number.
Notwithstanding the superiority of the Persian fleet, Parmenio advised
Alexander to fight a sea-battle, expecting that the Greeks would be
victorious with their fleet both for other reasons and especially
because an omen from the deity made him confident of the result; for
an eagle had been seen sitting upon the shore, opposite the sterns of
Alexander’s ships.[156] He also urged that if they won the battle, they
would reap a great advantage from it in regard to their main object
in the war; and if they were beaten, their defeat would not be of any
great moment; for even as it was, the Persians held the sovereignty of
the sea. He added that he was willing to go on board the fleet himself
and to share the danger. However, Alexander replied that Parmenio was
mistaken in his judgment, and did not explain the sign according to
probability. For it would be rash for him with a few ships to fight a
battle against a fleet far more numerous than his own, and with his
unpractised naval force to contend against the disciplined fleet of
the Cyprians and Phoenicians. Besides, he did not wish to deliver over
to the foreigners on so unstable an element the advantage which the
Macedonians derived from their skill and courage; and if they were
beaten in the sea-battle, their defeat would be no small hindrance to
their final success in the war, both for other reasons, and especially
because the Greeks, being animated with courage at the news of his
naval defeat, would attempt to effect a revolution. Taking all these
things into consideration, he declared that he did not think that it
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