The Analogy of Religion to the Constitution and Course of Nature: To which are added two brief dissertations: I. On personal identity. II. On the nature of virtue.Butler, Joseph
Religion
The Analogy of Religion to the Constitution and Course of Nature: To which are added two brief dissertations: I. On personal identity. II. On the nature of virtue.
Butler, Joseph
Analogy (Religion); Apologetics -- Early works to 1800; Eschatology; Natural theology; Revelation
What, in particular, is the account or reason of these things, we must
be greatly in the dark, were it only that we know so very little even
of our own case. Our present state may possibly be the consequence
of something past, of which we are wholly ignorant: as it has a
reference to somewhat to come, of which we know scarce any more than
is necessary for practice. A system or constitution, in its notion,
implies variety; and so complicated a one as this world, very great
variety. So that were revelation universal, yet, from men’s different
capacities of understanding, from the different lengths of their lives,
their different educations and other external circumstances, and from
their difference of temper and bodily constitution, their religious
situations would be widely different, and the disadvantage of some in
comparison of others, perhaps, altogether as much as at present. The
true account, whatever it be, why mankind, or such a part of mankind,
are placed in this condition of ignorance, must be supposed also the
true account of our further ignorance, in not knowing the reasons why,
or whence it is, that they are placed in this condition.
The following practical reflections may deserve the serious
consideration of those persons, who think the circumstances of mankind
or their own, in the forementioned respects, a ground of complaint.
_First_, The evidence of religion not appearing obvious, may constitute
one particular part of some men’s trial in the religious sense: as
it gives scope, for a virtuous exercise, or vicious neglect of their
understanding, in examining or not examining into that evidence. There
seems no possible reason to be given, why we may not be in a state
of moral probation, with regard to the exercise of our understanding
upon the subject of religion, as we are with regard to our behavior
in common affairs. The former is as much a thing within our power and
choice as the latter. And I suppose it is to be laid down for certain,
that the same character, the same inward principle, which, after a man
is convinced of the truth of religion, renders him obedient to the
precepts of it, would, were he not thus convinced, set him about an
examination of it, upon its system and evidence being offered to his
thoughts: and that in the latter state his examination would be with an
impartiality, seriousness, and solicitude, proportionable to what his
obedience is in the former. And as inattention, negligence, want of all
serious concern, about a matter of such a nature and such importance,
when offered to men’s consideration, is, before a distinct conviction
of its truth, as real depravity and dissoluteness, as neglect of
religious practice after such conviction: so active solicitude about
it, and fair impartial consideration of its evidence before such
conviction, is as really an exercise of a morally right temper; as
is religious practice after. Thus, that religion is not intuitively
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