But, while a concept is incapable of being pictured mentally as an image, it is true that _some particular representative of a class_ may be held in the mind or imagination as _an idealized object_, as a general representative of the class, when we speak or think of the general term or concept, providing that its real relation to the concept is recognized. These idealized objects, however, are not concepts--they are _percepts_ reproduced by the memory. It is important, however, to all who wish to convey their thought plainly, that they be able to convert their concepts into idealized representative objects. Otherwise, they tend to become too idealistic and abstract for common comprehension. As Halleck well says: "We should in all cases be ready to translate our concepts, when occasion requires, into the images of those individuals which the concept represents. A concept means nothing except in reference to certain individuals. Without them it could never have had existence and they are entitled to representation. A man who cannot translate his concepts into definite images of the proper objects, is fitted neither to teach, preach, nor practice any profession.... There was, not long ago, a man very fond of talking about _fruit_ in the abstract; but he failed to recognize an individual cranberry when it was placed before him. A humorist remarked that a certain metaphysician had such a love for abstractions, and such an intense dislike for concrete things, as to refuse to eat a concrete peach when placed before him." In the beginning many students are perplexed regarding the difference between a _percept_ and a _concept_. The distinction is simple when properly considered. A percept is: "the object of an act of perception; that which is perceived." A concept is: "a mental representation." Brooks makes the following distinction: "A _percept_ is the mental product of a real thing; a _concept_ is a mere idea or notion of the common attributes of things. A _percept_ represents some particular object; a _concept_ is not particular, but general. A _percept_ can be described by particulars; a _concept_ can be described only by generals. The former can usually be represented by an image, the latter cannot be imagined, _it can only be thought_." Thus one is able to image the _percept_ of a particular horse which has been perceived; but he is unable to image correctly the concept of _horse_ as a class or generic term.