The army being almost within reach of the first objective point, if the enemy oppose him there will be a battle; if indecisive, the fight will be resumed; if the army gains the victory, it will secure its objective point or will advance to attain a second. Should the first objective point be the possession of an important fort, the siege will be commenced. If the army be not strong enough to continue its march, after detaching a sufficient force to maintain the siege, it will take a strategic position to cover it, as did the army of Italy in 1796, which, less than fifty thousand strong, could not pass Mantua to enter Austria, leaving twenty-five thousand enemies within its walls, and having forty thousand more in front on the double line of the Tyrol and Frioul. If the army be strong enough to make the best use of its victory, or if it have no siege to make, it will operate toward a second and more important objective point. If this point be distant, it will be necessary to establish an intermediate point of support. One or more secure cities already occupied will form an eventual base: when this cannot be done, a small strategic reserve may be established, which will protect the rear and also the depots by temporary fortifications. When the army crosses large streams, it will construct _têtes de pont_; and, if the bridges are within walled cities, earth-works will be thrown up to increase the means of defense and to secure the safety of the eventual base or the strategic reserve which may occupy these posts. Should the battle be lost, the army will retreat toward its base, in order to be reinforced therefrom by detachments of troops, or, what is equivalent, to strengthen itself by the occupation of fortified posts and camps, thus compelling the enemy to halt or to divide his forces. When winter approaches, the armies will either go into quarters, or the field will be kept by the army which has obtained decisive success and is desirous of profiting to the utmost by its superiority. These winter campaigns are very trying to both armies, but in other respects do not differ from ordinary campaigns, unless it be in demanding increased activity and energy to attain prompt success. Such is the ordinary course of a war, and as such we will consider it, while discussing combinations which result from these operations. Strategy embraces the following points, viz.:-- 1. The selection of the theater of war, and the discussion of the different combinations of which it admits. 2. The determination of the decisive points in these combinations, and the most favorable direction for operations. 3. The selection and establishment of the fixed base and of the zone of operations. 4. The selection of the objective point, whether offensive or defensive. 5. The strategic fronts, lines of defense, and fronts of operations. 6. The choice of lines of operations leading to the objective point or strategic front.