Everest, Mount (China and Nepal); Mount Everest Expedition (1922); Mountaineering expeditions--Everest, Mount (China and Nepal)
It will be understood from this method of calculation how we arrive at
the number of loads which must be carried up to any given camp; it is
observable that at each stage downwards the number increases in a
proportion considerably greater than 2:1. Fortunately we are not obliged
to proceed strictly on these lines; to the lower camps we need not carry
up the whole of our stores on one day, and consequently we need not
increase in this alarming ratio the number of our porters. But in any
case when we get down to the North Col we must clearly have a large bulk
of stores; and the fewer porters we employ between one stage and
another, economizing on tents and sleeping-bags, the more time we shall
require.
It was clear from the start that time was likely to be a formidable
enemy. General Bruce’s problem was not only to move our vast quantity of
stores across an almost barren country, but to move them in a given
time. It was fortunate for this reason that the number of porters who
came with us was not increased, for every man must add something to our
burdens. No one who knows that arid country could fail to be surprised
that we reached our Base Camp below the Rongbuk Glacier so early as the
1st of May. But now the number of Nepalese porters—only forty were
available for carrying—was too small for all our needs. If they alone
were to shoulder all our loads when should we reach the North Col? Some
sort of depôt must be established below it at 21,000 feet for the supply
of all higher camps on the mountain before we could proceed; and the
reconnaissance party determined that two staging camps would be required
between the Base Camp and this depôt. The existence and the solution of
so large a problem of transport have so important a bearing on our later
plans that I must refer to it again in this place. General Bruce has
told how he impressed Tibetans into his service, and by using them up to
Camp II was able to liberate our own porters much earlier than might
have been expected for work further on. But the system of employing
Tibetans did not work without a hitch. It was because the first labour
battalion absconded that General Bruce gave orders for only two of us to
go forward and use the first opportunities for pushing on from Camp III.
With the prospect of an early monsoon and a shortage of transport it was
desirable that, so soon as any porters were available for work above
Camp III, this work should be pushed on without delay, and if necessary
an assault should be made with the minimum of stores required by a party
of two climbers. Without a further supply of transport there was no
question of using the oxygen, for we should have more than enough to
carry up without it.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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